Proof-oriented programming for high-assurance systems

Aseem Rastogi
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Abstract

Proof-oriented programming is a paradigm where programs are designed and developed along with mathematical proofs of their correctness and security. In recent years, proof-oriented programming has reached a point where not only several high-assurance software components have been developed using it, but these components have also been deployed in production systems. In this talk, I will provide an overview of this paradigm in the context of F*, a proof-oriented programming language developed at Microsoft Research. I will briefly discuss several critical software components, developed from scratch in F*. These components are already deployed in production systems such as Windows Hyper-V, the Linux kernel, Firefox, and mbedTLS. As a complementary methodology for retrofitting strong, formal guarantees on existing legacy services, I will present the Zeta framework. Zeta works by running a small, proven correct monitor in a trusted execution environment validating responses from the service. The key idea is that we only need to develop the monitor using proof-oriented programming once-and-for-all, while the large legacy service remains untrusted. I will illustrate Zeta by sketching an example of how we can make a concurrent, high-performance, key-value store "zero trust" and argue that this step incurs modest software engineering effort and modest runtime overheads.
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面向证明的高保证系统编程
面向证明的编程是一种范例,其中程序的设计和开发伴随着对其正确性和安全性的数学证明。近年来,面向证明的编程已经发展到一个地步,不仅使用它开发了几个高保证软件组件,而且这些组件也部署在生产系统中。在这次演讲中,我将在微软研究院开发的一种面向证明的编程语言F*的背景下概述这种范式。我将简要讨论几个关键的软件组件,它们是在F*中从头开始开发的。这些组件已经部署在Windows Hyper-V、Linux内核、Firefox和mbedTLS等生产系统中。我将介绍Zeta框架,作为对现有遗留服务进行强大、正式保证的补充方法。Zeta通过在可信的执行环境中运行一个小型的、经过验证的正确监视器来验证来自服务的响应。关键思想是,我们只需要一次性地使用面向证明的编程开发监视器,而大型遗留服务仍然不受信任。我将通过绘制一个示例来说明Zeta,该示例说明我们如何创建一个并发的、高性能的、键值存储“零信任”,并认为这一步只需要适度的软件工程工作和适度的运行时开销。
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