Epistemic Peerhood and Standpoint Theory

J. Piñeiro
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper uses standpoint theory to explore whether all there is to establish epistemic peerhood between subjects is that they be (i) equally exposed to or familiar with the evidence pertaining to a disagreed claim, and be (ii) equals with regards to intelligence, freedom from bias and similar epistemic virtues within the domain of the claim in question. I argue that there is at least one general circumstance in which conditions (i) and (ii) are met, but nevertheless the subjects deviate in their likelihood to be mistaken about the claim in question, thus preventing them from being epistemic peers. Such a circumstance presents itself as a case in which the claim in question is part of those aspects of social relations and experiences of the marginalized.
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认识论与立场论
本文使用立场理论来探讨是否所有建立主体之间的知识对等关系的条件是,他们(i)同样地接触或熟悉与不同意的主张有关的证据,并且(ii)在有关主张的领域内,他们在智力、无偏见和类似的知识美德方面是平等的。我认为,至少存在一种一般情况,在这种情况下,条件(I)和(ii)得到满足,但尽管如此,受试者对所讨论的主张的错误可能性有所偏离,从而阻止他们成为认知上的同伴。在这种情况下,所讨论的要求是社会关系和边缘化经验的一部分。
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