A Study on the Evolutionary Game of Dynamic Relationship between Microblogging Platform and Leader
Lei Xu, Yongxiang Sheng, Jie Wu, Jun-Wei Hu, Qinfen Shi
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper, the loss difference and other influencing factors between Microblogging platform and leader users in the process of advertising game are included into their cooperation income, and the game payment matrix is constructed to obtain the equilibrium solution of the game between the two sides, and the influence of the changes of relevant factors on the game between the two sides is studied through the example simulation. The research shows that: the higher the investigation cost and bonus paid by microblog platform, the weaker the willingness of microblog platform to choose "investigation" strategy. The more fines paid by the leader users, the greater the loss difference caused to the microblog platform, and the stronger the willingness of the microblog platform to choose the "investigation" strategy. By formulating reasonable incentive system, Microblogging platform and leader users can achieve mutual benefit and symbiosis. 微博平台与领袖用户动态关系的博弈研究 徐雷 ,盛永祥 ,吴洁 ,胡俊 ,施琴芬 2 江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏 镇江 苏州科技大学科研产业部,江苏 苏州 546019357@qq.com 通讯作者 关键词:微博平台;领袖用户;演化博弈;均衡解 摘要.将微博平台与领袖用户在是否发布广告博弈过程中的损失差等影响因素纳入其合作收 益中,构建双方博弈支付矩阵,求得双方博弈的均衡解,并通过实例仿真研究相关因素变化 对双方博弈的影响。研究表明:微博平台支付的调查成本和奖金越高,微博平台选择“调查” 策略的意愿越弱;领袖用户支付的罚金越多,对微博平台造成的损失差越大,微博平台选择 “调查”策略的意愿越强;通过制定合理的激励制度可以让微博平台与领袖用户互利共生。 1. 研究背景 随着移动互联时代的迅速发展,微博平台在企业经营和营销中发挥着越来越重要的作 用。企业等领袖用户通过微博平台取得了良好的经济效益,但是微博平台却为了平台运行付 4th International Conference on Humanities Science and Society Development (ICHSSD 2019) Copyright © 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, volume 328
微博平台与领导者动态关系演化博弈研究
本文将微博平台与领先用户在广告博弈过程中的损失差异等影响因素纳入其合作收益中,构建博弈支付矩阵,得到双方博弈的均衡解,并通过实例仿真研究相关因素的变化对双方博弈的影响。研究表明:微博平台支付的调查成本和奖金越高,微博平台选择“调查”策略的意愿越弱。领先用户缴纳的罚款越多,对微博平台造成的损失差异越大,微博平台选择“查处”策略的意愿越强。通过制定合理的激励机制,微博平台和领导用户可以实现互利共赢。微博平台与领袖用户动态关系的博弈研究徐雷,盛永祥,吴洁,胡俊,施琴芬2江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江苏州科技大学科研产业部,江苏苏州546019357 @qq.com通讯作者关键词:微博平台,领袖用户;演化博弈;均衡解摘要。将微博平台与领袖用户在是否发布广告博弈过程中的损失差等影响因素纳入其合作收 益中,构建双方博弈支付矩阵,求得双方博弈的均衡解,并通过实例仿真研究相关因素变化 对双方博弈的影响。研究表明:微博平台支付的调查成本和奖金越高,微博平台选择“调查” 策略的意愿越弱;领袖用户支付的罚金越多,对微博平台造成的损失差越大,微博平台选择 “调查”策略的意愿越强;通过制定合理的激励制度可以让微博平台与领袖用户互利共生。 1. 研究背景 随着移动互联时代的迅速发展,微博平台在企业经营和营销中发挥着越来越重要的作 用。第四届人文科学与社会发展国际学术会议(ICHSSD 2019)版权所有©2019,作者。亚特兰蒂斯出版社出版。这是一篇基于CC BY-NC许可(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/)的开放获取文章。社会科学、教育和人文研究进展,第328卷
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