Conclusion to Part VII

Abstract

The picture that emerges of war termination in Iraq is one of sophisticated military efforts and fragmented political activities that were powered by poor strategic empathy and untethered to an integrated strategy. As discussed in Part IV, the Bush administration assumed a decisive victory over Saddam Hussein’s fielded forces would yield lasting success. Obsessed with military details, the US government failed to develop a strategy that brought together and managed the elements of national power to bring about a favorable and durable outcome. When decisive victory failed to materialize, the United States was left scrambling for a way forward. The failure to consider war termination led to a myopic strategy that fixated on the military campaign and ignored the aftermath, and set the stage for the super-empowerment of mostly Shi’a exiles and elites and decisions to launch a de-Ba’athification campaign and disband the Iraqi Army. Aggressive military efforts fed perceptions of Sunni Arab disenfranchisement. The latter fought back, igniting a fierce insurgency. This gap in strategy heightened the risk that the war would turn into a quagmire....