The final chapter on the Afghanistan case study argues that the Obama administration agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan when the country’s situation was highly unsatisfactory, and U.S. leverage was at a low point. The Taliban remained resilient, and the Afghan government plagued with problems of corruption and predation.
{"title":"Fallout","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.2307/j.ctt22p7j53.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22p7j53.37","url":null,"abstract":"The final chapter on the Afghanistan case study argues that the Obama administration agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan when the country’s situation was highly unsatisfactory, and U.S. leverage was at a low point. The Taliban remained resilient, and the Afghan government plagued with problems of corruption and predation.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116406640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027
Christopher D. Kolenda
As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.
{"title":"From Decisive Victory to Transition","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0027","url":null,"abstract":"As the Bush administration drifted from a decisive-victory approach toward transition-and-withdraw, the CPA disbanded, and control was given to the Iraqis. The U.S. aimed to contain the Sunni insurgency so that Iraqi forces could handle it, but decisions surrounding elections and the new constitution further deepened the rift between Sunni and Shia. While the Bush administration kept ignoring the signs, the Sunni insurgency had become sustainable, enjoying local popular and external support.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114335630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0011
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter argues that the patron-client relationship between the U.S. and the Afghan governments became increasingly strained through misunderstandings and miscommunication. The Bush administration assumed that its interests were shared by a Karzai government in control of the country, but Karzai’s power was continuously being challenged and his trust in U.S. support was limited. As Karzai aimed of secure his power, the scale of corruption and the alienation of parts of the population only grew further. The Bush administration, however, did not fully understand the limitations of its partner government nor the extent of the growing insurgency.
{"title":"Failing to Keep Pace with the Insurgency, 2007–2009","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the patron-client relationship between the U.S. and the Afghan governments became increasingly strained through misunderstandings and miscommunication. The Bush administration assumed that its interests were shared by a Karzai government in control of the country, but Karzai’s power was continuously being challenged and his trust in U.S. support was limited. As Karzai aimed of secure his power, the scale of corruption and the alienation of parts of the population only grew further. The Bush administration, however, did not fully understand the limitations of its partner government nor the extent of the growing insurgency.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114373914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9674.003.0037
J. Benthem
This book draws on ideas from philosophical logic, computational logic, multi-agent systems, and game theory to offer a comprehensive account of logic and games viewed in two complementary ways. It examines the logic of games: the development of sophisticated modern dynamic logics that model information flow, communication, and interactive structures in games. It also examines logic as games: the idea that logical activities of reasoning and many related tasks can be viewed in the form of games. In doing so, the book takes up the "intelligent interaction" of agents engaging in competitive or cooperative activities and examines the patterns of strategic behavior that arise. It develops modern logical systems that can analyze information-driven changes in players' knowledge and beliefs, and introduces the "Theory of Play" that emerges from the combination of logic and game theory. This results in a new view of logic itself as an interactive rational activity based on reasoning, perception, and communication that has particular relevance for games. Logic in Games, based on a course taught by the author at Stanford University, the University of Amsterdam, and elsewhere, can be used in advanced seminars and as a resource for researchers.
{"title":"Conclusion to Part V","authors":"J. Benthem","doi":"10.7551/mitpress/9674.003.0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9674.003.0037","url":null,"abstract":"This book draws on ideas from philosophical logic, computational logic, multi-agent systems, and game theory to offer a comprehensive account of logic and games viewed in two complementary ways. It examines the logic of games: the development of sophisticated modern dynamic logics that model information flow, communication, and interactive structures in games. It also examines logic as games: the idea that logical activities of reasoning and many related tasks can be viewed in the form of games. In doing so, the book takes up the \"intelligent interaction\" of agents engaging in competitive or cooperative activities and examines the patterns of strategic behavior that arise. It develops modern logical systems that can analyze information-driven changes in players' knowledge and beliefs, and introduces the \"Theory of Play\" that emerges from the combination of logic and game theory. This results in a new view of logic itself as an interactive rational activity based on reasoning, perception, and communication that has particular relevance for games. Logic in Games, based on a course taught by the author at Stanford University, the University of Amsterdam, and elsewhere, can be used in advanced seminars and as a resource for researchers.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115929764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0004
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter argues that the U.S. national security establishment is organized intellectually and bureaucratically around the ability to wage conventional war. In irregular war, factors for success might differ from conventional war. With counterinsurgencies, reducing tangible support for the insurgency and winning the battle for legitimacy are the two critical factors for success.
{"title":"The Decisive Victory Paradigm Undermines Strategy for Irregular War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the U.S. national security establishment is organized intellectually and bureaucratically around the ability to wage conventional war. In irregular war, factors for success might differ from conventional war. With counterinsurgencies, reducing tangible support for the insurgency and winning the battle for legitimacy are the two critical factors for success.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131522825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0020
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter addresses the conflicting views on reconciliation of Afghan President Karzai, the Taliban, and their supporter Pakistan. It shows the complex web of interests and relations shaping the Afghan political development which complicated any reconciliation efforts.
{"title":"Competing Visions","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter addresses the conflicting views on reconciliation of Afghan President Karzai, the Taliban, and their supporter Pakistan. It shows the complex web of interests and relations shaping the Afghan political development which complicated any reconciliation efforts.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122320883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The picture that emerges of war termination in Iraq is one of sophisticated military efforts and fragmented political activities that were powered by poor strategic empathy and untethered to an integrated strategy. As discussed in Part IV, the Bush administration assumed a decisive victory over Saddam Hussein’s fielded forces would yield lasting success. Obsessed with military details, the US government failed to develop a strategy that brought together and managed the elements of national power to bring about a favorable and durable outcome. When decisive victory failed to materialize, the United States was left scrambling for a way forward. The failure to consider war termination led to a myopic strategy that fixated on the military campaign and ignored the aftermath, and set the stage for the super-empowerment of mostly Shi’a exiles and elites and decisions to launch a de-Ba’athification campaign and disband the Iraqi Army. Aggressive military efforts fed perceptions of Sunni Arab disenfranchisement. The latter fought back, igniting a fierce insurgency. This gap in strategy heightened the risk that the war would turn into a quagmire....
{"title":"Conclusion to Part VII","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.1201/b11298-39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1201/b11298-39","url":null,"abstract":"The picture that emerges of war termination in Iraq is one of sophisticated military efforts and fragmented political activities that were powered by poor strategic empathy and untethered to an integrated strategy. As discussed in Part IV, the Bush administration assumed a decisive victory over Saddam Hussein’s fielded forces would yield lasting success. Obsessed with military details, the US government failed to develop a strategy that brought together and managed the elements of national power to bring about a favorable and durable outcome. When decisive victory failed to materialize, the United States was left scrambling for a way forward. The failure to consider war termination led to a myopic strategy that fixated on the military campaign and ignored the aftermath, and set the stage for the super-empowerment of mostly Shi’a exiles and elites and decisions to launch a de-Ba’athification campaign and disband the Iraqi Army. Aggressive military efforts fed perceptions of Sunni Arab disenfranchisement. The latter fought back, igniting a fierce insurgency. This gap in strategy heightened the risk that the war would turn into a quagmire....","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125168055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0039
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter compares the insights from both case studies to show how the lack of war termination terminology led the U.S. to adopt myopic strategies aimed at decisive victory while ignoring the critical factors for such victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military invasion gave way to predatory governments, but the U.S. was slow to revise its strategy. Cognitive biases, bureaucratic silos, and patron-client issues led the U.S. to stick with strategies and ignore adverse signs. When the U.S. wanted to withdraw from those countries, bargaining asymmetries left them in a weak position, forcing them to withdraw without having achieved a durable and favorable outcome. By comparing those two cases, the chapter highlights the systemic nature of these problems.
{"title":"Iraq and Afghanistan Compared","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0039","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter compares the insights from both case studies to show how the lack of war termination terminology led the U.S. to adopt myopic strategies aimed at decisive victory while ignoring the critical factors for such victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military invasion gave way to predatory governments, but the U.S. was slow to revise its strategy. Cognitive biases, bureaucratic silos, and patron-client issues led the U.S. to stick with strategies and ignore adverse signs. When the U.S. wanted to withdraw from those countries, bargaining asymmetries left them in a weak position, forcing them to withdraw without having achieved a durable and favorable outcome. By comparing those two cases, the chapter highlights the systemic nature of these problems.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130297591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0008
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter argues that the structure of the U.S. national security apparatus favors compartmentalization over cooperation and coordination, leading to a focus on the micro-level and a lack of accountability. The separation of rebuilding tasks between different U.S. agencies, but also between different international actors, was quickly and aptly exploited by Afghan elites to promote personal and political power. Ineffective decisions stemming from compartmentalization created a sense of alienation and unwanted military occupation among the Afghan population. While Karzai struggled to get U.S. support, and disputes between local leaders led to civilian harm, the Taliban started to reorganize.
{"title":"America’s Bureaucratic Way of War","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the structure of the U.S. national security apparatus favors compartmentalization over cooperation and coordination, leading to a focus on the micro-level and a lack of accountability. The separation of rebuilding tasks between different U.S. agencies, but also between different international actors, was quickly and aptly exploited by Afghan elites to promote personal and political power. Ineffective decisions stemming from compartmentalization created a sense of alienation and unwanted military occupation among the Afghan population. While Karzai struggled to get U.S. support, and disputes between local leaders led to civilian harm, the Taliban started to reorganize.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115941654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-26DOI: 10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0031
Christopher D. Kolenda
This chapter introduces the ideas of subjective and objective civilian control over the military. The U.S., having a system of objective control, pushed Iraq to adopt the same system. Maliki, however, fearing a coup, pushed for subjective control over the Iraqi Security Forces to replace individuals unfavorable of him.
{"title":"Mirror Imaging Civil-Military Relations","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0031","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter introduces the ideas of subjective and objective civilian control over the military. The U.S., having a system of objective control, pushed Iraq to adopt the same system. Maliki, however, fearing a coup, pushed for subjective control over the Iraqi Security Forces to replace individuals unfavorable of him.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117185245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：