Peer Bargaining and Productivity in Teams: Gender and the Inequitable Division of Pay

L. Pierce, Laura W. Wang, Dennis J. Zhang
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

Problem description: A recent trend in personnel operations is to reduce hierarchy and allow employee teams to self-manage tasks, responsibilities, and rewards. Yet, we know little about how this arrangement relates to worker productivity and fairness. Academic/practical relevance: We provide the first firm-based evidence that when service teams are allowed to allocate compensation internally, the ensuing peer-bargaining process can generate inequitable outcomes for women. Methodology: We demonstrate this using fixed-effect models to identify productivity and peer-bargaining traits in 932 workers at 32 large Chinese beauty salons. We measure individual productivity through service and prepaid card sales and measure bargaining through the division of team-based commissions. We also build a parsimonious bargaining model to explain our empirical results. Results: Although productivity and bargaining outcomes are positively correlated, female workers consistently receive bargaining outcomes below their productivity level, whereas men are consistently overcompensated. Importantly, we provide evidence that our results can only be explained by a combination of higher prosociality and lower bargaining power in women. We also demonstrate that the resulting inequity is positively correlated with shorter tenure. Managerial implications: Our findings provide unique organizational evidence on how bargaining among peers relates to productivity in service operations. We show that the discriminatory social dynamics observed throughout society are evident in operational designs that delegate decision rights to teams and that the magnitude in these systems is at least as large as that observed in traditional hierarchical pay systems. Managers must anticipate and mitigate this gender-based inequity because it is in and of itself an operational performance issue, and because of the myriad of productivity, retention, and ethical implications that can result from peer-based bargaining.
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团队中的同伴谈判和生产力:性别和不公平的薪酬分配
问题描述:最近人事操作的一个趋势是减少等级制度,并允许员工团队自我管理任务、责任和奖励。然而,我们对这种安排与工人的生产力和公平之间的关系知之甚少。学术/实践意义:我们提供了第一个基于公司的证据,表明当服务团队被允许在内部分配薪酬时,随后的同行谈判过程可能会对女性产生不公平的结果。方法:我们使用固定效应模型来确定32家大型中国美容院的932名员工的生产率和同伴议价特征。我们通过服务和预付卡销售来衡量个人生产力,通过团队佣金的划分来衡量讨价还价。我们还建立了一个简约议价模型来解释我们的实证结果。结果:虽然生产力与议价结果呈正相关,但女性员工的议价结果始终低于其生产力水平,而男性员工的议价结果始终过高。重要的是,我们提供的证据表明,我们的结果只能用女性更高的亲社会性和更低的议价能力来解释。我们还证明,由此产生的不平等与较短的任期正相关。管理意义:我们的研究结果提供了独特的组织证据,证明同伴之间的讨价还价与服务运营中的生产力有关。我们表明,在将决策权委托给团队的操作设计中,整个社会观察到的歧视性社会动态是明显的,并且这些系统中的量级至少与传统等级薪酬系统中观察到的一样大。管理者必须预见并减轻这种基于性别的不平等,因为它本身就是一个运营绩效问题,而且因为基于同伴的讨价还价可能导致无数的生产力、留任和道德影响。
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