Optimal reserve price in dynamic sponsored search auction

Wei Yang, Youyi Feng, B. Xiao
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Abstract

We study how the search engine should update its reserve price in a sponsored search auction for a particular keyword given a certain number of ad links are sold. Different from a static auction where the optimal reserve price is proved to be constant, in a dynamic setting the optimal reserve price is dependent on not only advertisers' per-click values, but also the number of ad links sold. A search engine should gradually raise reserve price as more qualified advertisers arrive, and maintain the same threshold after all first-page positions are occupied.
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动态赞助搜索拍卖中的最优保留价
我们研究搜索引擎应该如何更新其保留价格,在赞助搜索拍卖的特定关键字给定一定数量的广告链接出售。在静态拍卖中,最优保留价格被证明是恒定的,而在动态拍卖中,最优保留价格不仅取决于广告商的每次点击价值,还取决于售出的广告链接数量。搜索引擎应该随着更多合格广告商的到来而逐步提高底价,并在所有第一页位置被占据后保持相同的门槛。
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