Self-Deception: Adopting False Beliefs for a Favorable Self-View

Zeeshan Samad
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Abstract

This paper demonstrates how people deceive themselves into thinking of themselves as altruistic. I present a lab experiment in which subjects need to decide whether to behave altruistically or selfishly in an ambiguous environment. Due to the nature of ambiguity in this environment, those who are pessimistic have a legitimate reason to behave selfishly, even if they are inherently altruistic. For people who are inherently selfish but like to think of themselves as altruistic, this environment can serve as a scapegoat for selfish behavior. That is, by falsely claiming to be pessimistic, individuals can behave selfishly without damaging their self-image of being altruistic. Through two seemingly unrelated experimental tasks, I elicit subjects’ adopted beliefs and true beliefs about the same probability. I find that selfish subjects adopt beliefs that are systematically more pessimistic beliefs than their true beliefs, whereas altruistic subjects adopt beliefs that are in alignment with their true beliefs. The most plausible explanation for why only selfish subjects manipulate their beliefs is that selfish behavior damages their self-image and belief manipulation helps them mitigate that damage; altruistic subjects, by contrast, have no such need for belief manipulation because their behavior does not damage their self-image.
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自我欺骗:采用错误的信念来获得有利的自我看法
这篇论文展示了人们如何欺骗自己,使自己认为自己是无私的。我提出了一个实验室实验,在这个实验中,受试者需要决定在一个模糊的环境中是利他还是自私。由于这种环境的模糊性,那些悲观的人有正当的理由表现得自私,即使他们天生是利他的。对于那些天生自私但喜欢认为自己是利他的人来说,这种环境可以成为自私行为的替罪羊。也就是说,通过谎称自己悲观,个人可以表现得自私,而不会损害他们利他的自我形象。通过两个看似无关的实验任务,我引出了受试者对同一概率的接受信念和真实信念。我发现自私的实验对象所接受的信念比他们的真实信念更悲观,而利他的实验对象所接受的信念则与他们的真实信念一致。对于为什么只有自私的实验对象操纵他们的信念,最合理的解释是,自私的行为损害了他们的自我形象,而信念操纵帮助他们减轻了这种损害;相比之下,利他主义的受试者不需要操纵信念,因为他们的行为不会损害他们的自我形象。
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