{"title":"General Equilibrium in the Presence of Time Costs","authors":"Johannes Ebert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1803129","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"If consumption takes time, and time is limited, there exists a time constraint in addition to the expenditure constraint of a consumer. This may lead to a form of satiation, where consumers cannot consume all commodities they purchase. We establish existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of a time constraint and recover a version of the first and second welfare theorem. While all equilibria are weakly Pareto-optimal, they may fail to be strongly Pareto-optimal: taking from satiated consumers and giving to non-satiated consumers increases social welfare. We give an example with identical consumers, where equal share is the only strongly Pareto-optimal allocation and should be chosen by a planner maximizing social welfare. We also suggest a simple explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803129","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
If consumption takes time, and time is limited, there exists a time constraint in addition to the expenditure constraint of a consumer. This may lead to a form of satiation, where consumers cannot consume all commodities they purchase. We establish existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of a time constraint and recover a version of the first and second welfare theorem. While all equilibria are weakly Pareto-optimal, they may fail to be strongly Pareto-optimal: taking from satiated consumers and giving to non-satiated consumers increases social welfare. We give an example with identical consumers, where equal share is the only strongly Pareto-optimal allocation and should be chosen by a planner maximizing social welfare. We also suggest a simple explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.