Studies conducted between the 1950s and 1970s found that the principles embodied in the First Amendment constituted a “clear norm” endorsed by large majorities of community leaders and virtually all legal practitioners and scholars. This consensus has since weakened under the strain of arguments that racist slurs, epithets, and other forms of expression that demean social identities are an intolerable affront to egalitarian values. Guided by the theory that norms are transmitted through social learning, we show that these developments have spurred a dramatic realignment in public tolerance of offensive expression about race, gender, and religious groups. Tolerance of such speech has declined overall, and its traditional relationships with ideology, education, and age have diminished or reversed. Speech subject to changing norms of tolerance ranges from polemic to scientific inquiry, the fringes to the mainstream of political discourse, and left to right, raising profound questions about the scope of permissible debate in contemporary American politics.
{"title":"The Realignment of Political Tolerance in the United States","authors":"Dennis Chong, J. Citrin, Morris Levy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3951377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3951377","url":null,"abstract":"Studies conducted between the 1950s and 1970s found that the principles embodied in the First Amendment constituted a “clear norm” endorsed by large majorities of community leaders and virtually all legal practitioners and scholars. This consensus has since weakened under the strain of arguments that racist slurs, epithets, and other forms of expression that demean social identities are an intolerable affront to egalitarian values. Guided by the theory that norms are transmitted through social learning, we show that these developments have spurred a dramatic realignment in public tolerance of offensive expression about race, gender, and religious groups. Tolerance of such speech has declined overall, and its traditional relationships with ideology, education, and age have diminished or reversed. Speech subject to changing norms of tolerance ranges from polemic to scientific inquiry, the fringes to the mainstream of political discourse, and left to right, raising profound questions about the scope of permissible debate in contemporary American politics.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"105 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132746152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to segments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic insecurity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space.
{"title":"The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe","authors":"L. Guiso, M. Morelli, T. Sonno, H. Herrera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3922661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3922661","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to segments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic insecurity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122545929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using data from a variety of public opinion sources, we explore changes in trust in the vote count. A historic gap in confidence between Democrats and Republicans has grown, caused by two reasons: (1) an unusually big increase in Democratic confidence coupled with a modest decrease in Republican confidence and (2) a pre-election trust gap that already placed Democrats more confident than Republicans. Looking at confidence that votes in one’s state were counted as intended, there is a sharp discontinuity in Republican responses at the 50% point in Trump two-party vote share. In addition, Republicans in states Trump lost were much less confident when more votes were cast by mail.
{"title":"The Confidence Earthquake: Seismic Shifts in Trust","authors":"J. Clark, Charles Stewart III","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3825118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3825118","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from a variety of public opinion sources, we explore changes in trust in the vote count. A historic gap in confidence between Democrats and Republicans has grown, caused by two reasons: (1) an unusually big increase in Democratic confidence coupled with a modest decrease in Republican confidence and (2) a pre-election trust gap that already placed Democrats more confident than Republicans. Looking at confidence that votes in one’s state were counted as intended, there is a sharp discontinuity in Republican responses at the 50% point in Trump two-party vote share. In addition, Republicans in states Trump lost were much less confident when more votes were cast by mail.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130438107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the electoral impact of biased endorsements in large Poisson elections with two candidates. Under fairly general conditions, we derive analytical approximations for the asymptotic voting equilibria. We show that, when the electorate is sufficiently polarized, manipulating public information about candidates' qualities can hardly affect the expected party vote shares from an ex-ante perspective. Nevertheless, such information manipulation can systematically affect the election outcome and voter turnout. We apply our framework to study the influence of the endorser's bias and the entry of new endorsers on the extent of electoral manipulation. With a single endorser, a rise in bias affects the election outcome in a non-monotonic way and reduces voter welfare. Importantly and surprisingly, manipulating election outcomes becomes easier, the larger is the electorate. Entry of a new endorser can systematically affect election outcomes and improve voter welfare in large elections if and only if the entrant is strictly less biased than all incumbents. Moreover, we show that such entry can either systematically increase or decrease voter turnout, depending on the biases of entrant and incumbent endorsers.
{"title":"Why Biased Endorsements Can Manipulate Elections","authors":"Junze Sun, A. Schram, R. Sloof","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3420703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3420703","url":null,"abstract":"We study the electoral impact of biased endorsements in large Poisson elections with two candidates. Under fairly general conditions, we derive analytical approximations for the asymptotic voting equilibria. We show that, when the electorate is sufficiently polarized, manipulating public information about candidates' qualities can hardly affect the expected party vote shares from an ex-ante perspective. Nevertheless, such information manipulation can systematically affect the election outcome and voter turnout. We apply our framework to study the influence of the endorser's bias and the entry of new endorsers on the extent of electoral manipulation. With a single endorser, a rise in bias affects the election outcome in a non-monotonic way and reduces voter welfare. Importantly and surprisingly, manipulating election outcomes becomes easier, the larger is the electorate. Entry of a new endorser can systematically affect election outcomes and improve voter welfare in large elections if and only if the entrant is strictly less biased than all incumbents. Moreover, we show that such entry can either systematically increase or decrease voter turnout, depending on the biases of entrant and incumbent endorsers.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115080683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The composition of governing coalitions does not always reflect the relative sizes of the coalition members, but research has not been able to fully reconcile why. We propose that political parties with more (re-elected) incumbent representatives fare better in coalitional bargaining. To evaluate this argument empirically, we construct a data set of parties and governing coalitions in Finnish local governments. Using an instrumental variable strategy that hinges on within-party close elections between incumbents and non-incumbents, we find that, ceteris paribus, having more re-elected incumbents improves a party’s coalitional bargaining outcomes. Descriptive evidence suggests that incumbent representation is particularly useful when a party is in a disadvantaged position (e.g., it is ideologically distant from other parties) and when the bargaining environment is more complex (e.g., there are more parties). Lastly, incumbent representation also matters for selection: parties that have more incumbent representatives nominate more incumbents in the municipal executive.
{"title":"The Advantage of Incumbents in Coalitional Bargaining","authors":"Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3758577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3758577","url":null,"abstract":"The composition of governing coalitions does not always reflect the relative sizes of the coalition members, but research has not been able to fully reconcile why. We propose that political parties with more (re-elected) incumbent representatives fare better in coalitional bargaining. To evaluate this argument empirically, we construct a data set of parties and governing coalitions in Finnish local governments. Using an instrumental variable strategy that hinges on within-party close elections between incumbents and non-incumbents, we find that, ceteris paribus, having more re-elected incumbents improves a party’s coalitional bargaining outcomes. Descriptive evidence suggests that incumbent representation is particularly useful when a party is in a disadvantaged position (e.g., it is ideologically distant from other parties) and when the bargaining environment is more complex (e.g., there are more parties). Lastly, incumbent representation also matters for selection: parties that have more incumbent representatives nominate more incumbents in the municipal executive.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131553228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we uncover the relationships among social trust, corruption and the duration of economic crises. Our theoretical foundation is based on a collection of studies from different academic fields, especially political science, sociology and economics. We corroborate our arguments with both descriptive analysis and regression analysis of secondary data. Our dataset includes 11,364 observations distributed across 211 countries. The quantitative findings show that social trust is correlated with the duration of economic crises. Connecting our theoretical stance with the empirical evidence, we propose several possible explanations for the findings and provide both theoretical and practical implications.
{"title":"The Predicting Abilities of Social Trust and Good Governance on Economic Crisis Duration","authors":"Jessica Nguyen, Tue Dinh, Marcus Selart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3663380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3663380","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we uncover the relationships among social trust, corruption and the duration of economic crises. Our theoretical foundation is based on a collection of studies from different academic fields, especially political science, sociology and economics. We corroborate our arguments with both descriptive analysis and regression analysis of secondary data. Our dataset includes 11,364 observations distributed across 211 countries. The quantitative findings show that social trust is correlated with the duration of economic crises. Connecting our theoretical stance with the empirical evidence, we propose several possible explanations for the findings and provide both theoretical and practical implications.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132428337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.
我们刻画了分离条件下相等损失的tu -对策的相等分割值、相等剩余分割值以及它们的仿射组合类。这一公理要求，如果一名玩家变成了“侏儒玩家”(Casajus and Huettner, 2014)，那么其他任何两名玩家都会受到同样的影响。
{"title":"Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values","authors":"Zhengxing Zou, R. van den Brink","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655072","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115985859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore some of the key themes in the Nobel Prize-winning economist James M. Buchanan’s classic works, showing how his ethical thinking, particularly in his Ethics and Economic Progress, apply to the problems facing firms and workers. We also explore how Buchanan’s ethical arguments pertain to the “public capital” of a flourishing society. Buchanan’s argument that we should work more, save more, and “pay the preacher” of “the institutions of moralethical communication” suggest several ways that people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to overall social flourishing and highlights some of the mechanisms by which those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. Our analysis shows how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.
{"title":"James M. Buchanan: Smithian Economist as Business Ethicist","authors":"Art Carden, Greg Caskey, Zachary Kessler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492169","url":null,"abstract":"We explore some of the key themes in the Nobel Prize-winning economist James M. Buchanan’s \u0000classic works, showing how his ethical thinking, particularly in his Ethics and Economic \u0000Progress, apply to the problems facing firms and workers. We also explore how Buchanan’s \u0000ethical arguments pertain to the “public capital” of a flourishing society. Buchanan’s argument \u0000that we should work more, save more, and “pay the preacher” of “the institutions of moralethical \u0000communication” suggest several ways that people with other-regarding preferences can \u0000contribute to overall social flourishing and highlights some of the mechanisms by which those \u0000who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. Our analysis \u0000shows how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his \u0000economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic \u0000analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127553614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this article finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanisms (JEL C92, D72).
{"title":"Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships","authors":"Kenju Kamei","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3670836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3670836","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this article finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanisms (JEL C92, D72).","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132692769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I study the transmission of COVID-19 in the dynamic SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Removed) model that allows individuals to optimally choose their public avoidance actions in response to the COVID-19 risk. I allow for heterogeneity in infection rates across age groups and structurally estimate the parameters to match the daily pattern of new cases and the ratio of patients by age group. Even in the absence of intervention, the elderly, who face a greater risk of death from COVID-19, are more likely than the young to take self-protective actions. In contrast to models with a fixed transmission rate, my model can capture the heterogeneity in the fraction of infected individuals among different age groups.
{"title":"COVID-19 and Endogenous Public Avoidance:Insights from an Economic Model","authors":"Wisarut Suwanprasert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3565564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565564","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I study the transmission of COVID-19 in the dynamic SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Removed) model that allows individuals to optimally choose their public avoidance actions in response to the COVID-19 risk. I allow for heterogeneity in infection rates across age groups and structurally estimate the parameters to match the daily pattern of new cases and the ratio of patients by age group. Even in the absence of intervention, the elderly, who face a greater risk of death from COVID-19, are more likely than the young to take self-protective actions. In contrast to models with a fixed transmission rate, my model can capture the heterogeneity in the fraction of infected individuals among different age groups.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125271631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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