{"title":"Comparing the Meaningfulness of Finite and Infinite Lives: Can We Reap What We Sow if We Are Immortal?","authors":"Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.1017/S1358246121000254","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.","PeriodicalId":269662,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246121000254","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Abstract On the rise over the past 20 years has been ‘moderate supernaturalism’, the view that while a meaningful life is possible in a world without God or a soul, a much greater meaning would be possible only in a world with them. William Lane Craig can be read as providing an important argument for a version of this view, according to which only with God and a soul could our lives have an eternal, as opposed to temporally limited, significance since we would then be held accountable for our decisions affecting others’ lives. I present two major objections to this position. On the one hand, I contend that if God existed and we had souls that lived forever, then, in fact, all our lives would turn out the same. On the other hand, I maintain that, if this objection is wrong, so that our moral choices would indeed make an ultimate difference and thereby confer an eternal significance on our lives (only) in a supernatural realm, then Craig could not capture the view, aptly held by moderate supernaturalists, that a meaningful life is possible in a purely natural world.
在过去的20年里,“适度的超自然主义”兴起,认为在没有上帝或灵魂的世界里,有意义的生活是可能的,但只有在有上帝或灵魂的世界里,才可能有更大的意义。威廉·莱恩·克雷格(William Lane Craig)可以被解读为为这一观点的一个版本提供了重要的论证,根据这一观点,只有上帝和灵魂,我们的生命才有永恒的意义,而不是暂时有限的意义,因为这样我们才能对影响他人生活的决定负责。我对这一立场提出两个主要反对意见。一方面,我认为,如果上帝存在,我们的灵魂永远活着,那么,事实上,我们所有的生活都将是一样的。另一方面,我坚持认为,如果这种反对意见是错误的,那么我们的道德选择确实会产生最终的差异,从而(仅)在超自然的领域中赋予我们的生命永恒的意义,那么克雷格就不能抓住温和的超自然主义者所恰当持有的观点,即在纯粹的自然世界中有可能有有意义的生活。