High Assurance Smart Grid: Smart Grid Control Systems Communications Architecture

Thomas M. Overman, R. Sackman
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引用次数: 44

Abstract

As increasing numbers of "smart" sensors and actuators are introduced into the electrical grid, the cyber security factor grows in significance, necessitating the implementation of information assurance controls for devices at all levels within the grid communications network. Determining the appropriate controls for any particular device first requires identifying its place within an established trust model. This paper aims to define a multilevel framework for a trust model to be used throughout the electrical grid. Assume compromise of control systems - A primary objective in developing this model is to support a distributed rather than hierarchical control system architecture based on the core assumption that the compromise of grid control system components and subsystems will always be to some extent unavoidable. Rather, therefore, than attempting to create an all-encompassing enclave of trust, our control system architectural model suggests that systems be designed in ways to narrow the sphere of implied trust by expecting the compromise of adjacent systems, thereby reducing the sphere of vulnerability. By starting with an expectation of control system component compromise or lack of trust, subsystem designs can be implemented with independent rather than dependent cyber security and energy control data flows. The term High Assurance Smart Grid (HASG) refers to a Smart Grid with a control system architecture characterized by a distributed architecture that is designed to mitigate against widespread failures when control system components themselves are compromised. Lessons-learned and best practices are adopted from power engineering, information technology, cyber security, and other disciplines to build the described HASG model.
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高保证智能电网:智能电网控制系统通信架构
随着越来越多的“智能”传感器和执行器被引入电网,网络安全因素变得越来越重要,需要对电网通信网络内各级设备实施信息保证控制。确定任何特定设备的适当控制首先需要确定其在已建立的信任模型中的位置。本文旨在为整个电网中使用的信任模型定义一个多层框架。假设控制系统的妥协-开发此模型的主要目标是支持分布式而不是分层控制系统架构,该架构基于网格控制系统组件和子系统的妥协在某种程度上总是不可避免的核心假设。因此,我们的控制系统架构模型建议,与其试图创建一个包罗万象的信任飞地,不如通过期望相邻系统的妥协来缩小隐含信任的范围,从而减少脆弱性的范围。从控制系统组件妥协或缺乏信任的预期开始,子系统设计可以使用独立而不是依赖的网络安全和能源控制数据流来实现。术语“高保证智能电网”(High Assurance Smart Grid, HASG)指的是具有分布式体系结构特征的控制系统体系结构的智能电网,该体系结构旨在减轻控制系统组件本身受到损害时出现的广泛故障。从电力工程、信息技术、网络安全和其他学科中吸取经验教训和最佳实践来构建所描述的HASG模型。
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