The Returns to Developed-Market Acquirers in Emerging Markets

Anusha Chari, P. Ouimet, L. Tesar
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

In stark contrast to the findings based on domestic M&A transactions, we find that the developed-market acquirers experience positive and significant announcement returns in transactions that involve an emerging-market target. On average, over the 1988-2003 period, developed-market acquirer returns show a statistically significant increase of 1.18% over a three-week event window when M&A transactions in emerging markets are announced. Abnormal returns for target firms are also positive and on average equal 6.8%. The acquisition of majority control is a key feature of transactions that deliver positive acquirer returns - acquirer return increases range from 3.3% to 4.9% when majority control of an emerging-market target is acquired. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls for country, time, industrial diversification, method of payment effects, as well as acquirer- and target-firm characteristics such as size and liquidity. We find positive support for two hypotheses which can explain these unique findings. First, we find that developed-market acquirer returns increase as emerging-market bond spreads widen. This suggests the ability of developed-market acquirers to provide access to finance may be particularly valuable for targets located in capital-scarce emerging markets. Second, we find that developed-market acquirer returns increase significantly when they gain majority control of targets in countries with high risks of expropriation and contract repudiation and a weak rule of law. We find minority control acquisitions in these same countries do not produce the same results. We argue that in majority control acquisitions the boundaries of the firm are extended, thus bonding an emerging-market target firm to a developed-market acquirer from a country with better institutions.
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发达市场收购方在新兴市场的回报
与基于国内并购交易的研究结果形成鲜明对比的是,我们发现,在涉及新兴市场目标的交易中,发达市场收购方的公告回报为正且显著。平均而言,在1988年至2003年期间,当新兴市场的并购交易被宣布时,发达市场收购者的回报率在三周的事件窗口中显示出1.18%的统计学显著增长。目标公司的异常回报也是正的,平均为6.8%。收购多数控制权是收购方回报为正的交易的一个关键特征——当收购新兴市场目标的多数控制权被收购时,收购方回报会增加3.3%至4.9%。结果对包括国家、时间、工业多样化、支付方式影响以及收购方和目标公司特征(如规模和流动性)的控制是稳健的。我们发现有两个假设可以解释这些独特的发现。首先,我们发现随着新兴市场债券息差的扩大,发达市场收购者的回报会增加。这表明,发达市场收购方提供融资渠道的能力,对于位于资本稀缺的新兴市场的收购目标来说,可能特别有价值。其次,我们发现,在发达市场中,在征收和违约风险高、法治薄弱的国家,收购方获得目标公司的多数控制权时,收购方的回报显著增加。我们发现,在这些国家进行的少数股权收购并没有产生同样的结果。我们认为,在多数股权收购中,公司的边界被扩展,从而将新兴市场目标公司与来自拥有更好制度的国家的发达市场收购者联系在一起。
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