Distributive Politics under Institutionalized Authoritarianism: Evidence from China's Subnational Land Finance

Abstract

In this research we advance a theory to explain the distributive politics under an institutionalized single-party regime. We argue that the need of support from below, and therefore the need of support-buying, varies with the degree of power concentration among the authoritarian leadership. Compared with the scenario in which a few leaders have concentrated more power in their hands, when power are dispersed more evenly among political leaders, they face more competition, more uncertainties and risks, providing them with greater incentive of dispensing benefits to their constituents in exchange of their loyalty and support. To test the theory, this study uses a provincial-year panel data spanning 2003-2012 to examine how provincial power concentration in a provincial leadership is related with land finance within its jurisdiction, a policy practice that tilts the interest distribution disproportionately towards local politicians at the costs of the marginalized and powerless groups. The empirical results robustly show the less (more) power concentrated in the provincial leaders, the greater (less) extent the province will allow the practice of land finance to please the local officials.