IMMANUEL KANT’S THEORY OF LAUGHTER AND PHILOSOPHICAL IRONY

Abstract

INTRODUCTION When we study various philosophical points of view on nature, causes and functions of laughter, the first thing that catches our eye is the antinomic character of the corresponding discourse. Almost every aspect of theoretical study of laughter practices is represented by opposing statements. Whether it is about social or biological understanding of laughter; about its rational or sensual character; about different “laughters” or “laughter in general”; about its moral usefulness or immorality; about the opposition of laughter practices to the authoritarian ideology or the conventional nature of relevant discourses, etc., each time we come across not a “wrong” or “right” understanding, but a whole range of invariant solutions. Each of them has its own argumentation, the scope of practical verification and, accordingly, its own right to exist. Still, at the same time, not a single philosophical paradigm is able to put an end to a long discussion about the nature and essence of laughter as a kind of “thing in itself”. The sum of these positions and paradigms in their interaction and development comprises the philosophy of laughter. There are also diametrically opposed points of view as to the content of the philosophy of laughter. For some, laughter is the “pseudo-being” 1 , a “rare topic” of philosophizing 2 , which has a “bad reputation” 3 . For other philosophers, on the contrary, laughter plays a “central role in mental life and social discourse” 4 , and is seen as a crucial factor shaping a high quality of life 5 . A positive attitude to laughter, as well as a statement of the importance of the corresponding philosophical reflections, comes from the understanding that laughter is “at the intersection ... of the basic coordinates of the human