Constitutional Design and Territorial Cleavages

Abstract

This chapter considers a variety of constitutional options for resolving and managing enduring territorial cleavages. Three categories of constitutional tools are discussed: those that involve allocation of decision-making to different levels of government, including federalism, autonomy, and various forms of devolution; those that concern central government institutions, including representation of territorial interests at the center, budget redistribution, and rights; and those that allow the territorial units to exit. The chapter also explores how Constitutions deal with secession and concludes with an analysis of the role of courts in establishing and guaranteeing constitutional bargains on territory as well as the role of international institutions in helping to resolve institutional problems of territorial cleavages. It shows that a combination of representation and decentralization may be sufficient to stabilize territorial cleavages, and that the traditional rationales for federalism do not seem to fit with the resolution of territorial cleavages.