National Culture and Analysts’ Forecasting Behavior

Ying Cao, Rubin Hao, Yong George Yang
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Abstract

We examine whether national culture, in particular, its individualism/collectivism dimension, affects sell-side financial analysts’ forecasting behavior. We find that analysts from individualistic cultures are more likely to issue bold earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than analysts from collectivistic cultures. These results are related to individualistic (collectivistic) analysts’ inclination to over-weight (under-weight) their private information in forming forecasts. The culture’s effect is not permanent: Although slowly, it does decay over time. For market consequences, short-window market reactions are stronger to bold reports by collectivistic analysts than to those by individualistic analysts. For longer-term effects, we find that higher individualism of the covering analysts is associated with lower stock price synchronicity, indicating proportionately more firm-specific information impounded in the stock price. In net, however, we find that individualistic and collectivistic analysts appear to be equally effective in mitigating firms’ information asymmetry.
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民族文化与分析师的预测行为
我们考察了民族文化,特别是其个人主义/集体主义维度,是否会影响卖方金融分析师的预测行为。我们发现,来自个人主义文化的分析师比来自集体主义文化的分析师更有可能发布大胆的盈利预测和股票推荐。这些结果与个人主义(集体主义)分析师倾向于在形成预测时高估(低估)他们的私人信息有关。这种文化的影响不是永久的:虽然缓慢,但它确实会随着时间的推移而衰减。就市场后果而言,短期窗口市场对集体主义分析师的大胆报告的反应强于个人主义分析师的报告。对于长期效应,我们发现覆盖分析师的较高个人主义与较低的股价同步性相关,这表明股价中包含的公司特定信息成比例地更多。然而,在网络上,我们发现个人主义和集体主义分析师在缓解企业信息不对称方面似乎同样有效。
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