{"title":"Structuralism in Modern Business-Cycle Theory: A Framework for a Structuralist Reconceptualization","authors":"Peter Galbács","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3015932","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this tiny paper, a possible framework for a structuralist analysis of modern business-cycle theory is considered. In order to respond to the debates around the realist and instrumentalist interpretations of the works of Friedman I will provide a framework in which the tension between the opposite standpoints can be overcome. Based on epistemic structural realism, firstly, I will identify Friedman’s stance as a mix of agent-level instrumentalism and macro-level causal realism and, secondly, I will scrutinize the consistency of this epistemic strategy. I will argue that causal realism requires one to be realist regarding the assumptions defining agents as well.","PeriodicalId":274918,"journal":{"name":"PRN: Physical Sciences (Topic)","volume":"339 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PRN: Physical Sciences (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3015932","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this tiny paper, a possible framework for a structuralist analysis of modern business-cycle theory is considered. In order to respond to the debates around the realist and instrumentalist interpretations of the works of Friedman I will provide a framework in which the tension between the opposite standpoints can be overcome. Based on epistemic structural realism, firstly, I will identify Friedman’s stance as a mix of agent-level instrumentalism and macro-level causal realism and, secondly, I will scrutinize the consistency of this epistemic strategy. I will argue that causal realism requires one to be realist regarding the assumptions defining agents as well.