{"title":"Group-Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Job Matching with Continuous Transfers","authors":"Jan Christoph Schlegel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3157803","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a generalized job matching model.","PeriodicalId":170522,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other European Economics: Labor & Social Conditions (Topic)","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Other European Economics: Labor & Social Conditions (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157803","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a generalized job matching model.
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