Nomadography: The ‘Early’ Deleuze and the History of Philosophy

R. Tally
{"title":"Nomadography: The ‘Early’ Deleuze and the History of Philosophy","authors":"R. Tally","doi":"10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20105113","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. [...] Many members of my generation never broke free of this; others did, by inventing their own particular methods and new rules, a new approach. I myself \"did\" history of philosophy for a long time, read books on this or that author. But I compensated in various ways: by concentrating, in the first place, on authors who challenged the rationalist tradition in this history (and I see a secret link between Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, constituted by their critique of negativity, their cultivation of joy, the denunciation of power ... and so on). Gilles Deleuze, \"Letter to a Harsh Critic\" (1) In his Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel says that \"What the history of philosophy displays to us is a series of noble spirits, the gallery of the heroes of reason's thinking,\" but that the history of philosophy would have little value if thought of as a mere collection of opinions, in themselves arbitrary and thus worthless: \"But philosophy contains no opinions; there are no philosophical opinions.\" (2) Hence, Hegel says, those who wish to understand the history of philosophy by studying the individual philosophers it comprises, rather than achieving a more universal idea of the totality of its thought, will be missing the forest for the trees. \"Anyone who starts by examining the trees, and sticks simply to them, does not survey the whole wood and gets lost and bewildered in it.\" (3) For Hegel, the history of philosophy is the overarching concept, and the evolutionary realization, of philosophy itself. Let it be said up front: Gilles Deleuze hates this history of philosophy. Indeed, he does not care for the philosopher and philosophy underlying that view: \"What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics.\" (4) However, Deleuze does not abandon or reject the history of philosophy. Rather, he transforms the project into something else, a \"nomadography,\" which projects an alternative history of philosophy that not only allows Deleuze to \"get out\" of that institution, but allows us to re-imagine it in productive new ways. Deleuze's distaste for the history of philosophy, the Hegelian institution presented to him and his contemporaries in school and which formed a basic requirement of the profession of philosophy in France, is overcome by his peculiar approach to the history of philosophy, an approach that redeems philosophy as it transfigures it. Typically, any discussion of Deleuze's career draws a line between his \"early\" work, those monographs produced between 1953 and 1968 dealing with individual figures from the history of Western philosophy, and Deleuze's later work \"written in his own voice\" (such as Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense), (5) followed by his 1970s-era collaborations with Felix Guattari, and finally with his diverse post-Capitalism and Schizophrenia writings, culminating perhaps in What is Philosophy? (also co-authored with Guattari). Although Deleuze himself has remarked that his early works were devoted to the history of philosophy, readers of his entire oeuvre will notice that the concerns animating those early studies are still engaged in his later work. Moreover, one could say that Deleuze never really stopped \"doing\" the history of philosophy, albeit in his own rather eccentric way. In addition to those early monographs on Hume, (6) Nietzsche, (7) Kant, (8) Bergson, (9) and Spinoza, (10) Deleuze wrote studies devoted to the philosophers Leibniz, Foucault, and his old friend Frangois Chatelet, (11) as well as maintaining an ongoing conversations with his nomad thinkers and other figures from the history of philosophy in the collaborations with Guattari, (12) in his dealings with literature (including a book on Proust and a lengthy essay on Sacher-Masoch, (13) in addition to the Kafka study), and in his books on cinema and on Francis Bacon, (14) to name just the book-length studies; his essays and other shorter works frequently address the history of philosophy. …","PeriodicalId":288505,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20105113","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6

Abstract

I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. [...] Many members of my generation never broke free of this; others did, by inventing their own particular methods and new rules, a new approach. I myself "did" history of philosophy for a long time, read books on this or that author. But I compensated in various ways: by concentrating, in the first place, on authors who challenged the rationalist tradition in this history (and I see a secret link between Lucretius, Hume, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, constituted by their critique of negativity, their cultivation of joy, the denunciation of power ... and so on). Gilles Deleuze, "Letter to a Harsh Critic" (1) In his Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel says that "What the history of philosophy displays to us is a series of noble spirits, the gallery of the heroes of reason's thinking," but that the history of philosophy would have little value if thought of as a mere collection of opinions, in themselves arbitrary and thus worthless: "But philosophy contains no opinions; there are no philosophical opinions." (2) Hence, Hegel says, those who wish to understand the history of philosophy by studying the individual philosophers it comprises, rather than achieving a more universal idea of the totality of its thought, will be missing the forest for the trees. "Anyone who starts by examining the trees, and sticks simply to them, does not survey the whole wood and gets lost and bewildered in it." (3) For Hegel, the history of philosophy is the overarching concept, and the evolutionary realization, of philosophy itself. Let it be said up front: Gilles Deleuze hates this history of philosophy. Indeed, he does not care for the philosopher and philosophy underlying that view: "What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics." (4) However, Deleuze does not abandon or reject the history of philosophy. Rather, he transforms the project into something else, a "nomadography," which projects an alternative history of philosophy that not only allows Deleuze to "get out" of that institution, but allows us to re-imagine it in productive new ways. Deleuze's distaste for the history of philosophy, the Hegelian institution presented to him and his contemporaries in school and which formed a basic requirement of the profession of philosophy in France, is overcome by his peculiar approach to the history of philosophy, an approach that redeems philosophy as it transfigures it. Typically, any discussion of Deleuze's career draws a line between his "early" work, those monographs produced between 1953 and 1968 dealing with individual figures from the history of Western philosophy, and Deleuze's later work "written in his own voice" (such as Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense), (5) followed by his 1970s-era collaborations with Felix Guattari, and finally with his diverse post-Capitalism and Schizophrenia writings, culminating perhaps in What is Philosophy? (also co-authored with Guattari). Although Deleuze himself has remarked that his early works were devoted to the history of philosophy, readers of his entire oeuvre will notice that the concerns animating those early studies are still engaged in his later work. Moreover, one could say that Deleuze never really stopped "doing" the history of philosophy, albeit in his own rather eccentric way. In addition to those early monographs on Hume, (6) Nietzsche, (7) Kant, (8) Bergson, (9) and Spinoza, (10) Deleuze wrote studies devoted to the philosophers Leibniz, Foucault, and his old friend Frangois Chatelet, (11) as well as maintaining an ongoing conversations with his nomad thinkers and other figures from the history of philosophy in the collaborations with Guattari, (12) in his dealings with literature (including a book on Proust and a lengthy essay on Sacher-Masoch, (13) in addition to the Kafka study), and in his books on cinema and on Francis Bacon, (14) to name just the book-length studies; his essays and other shorter works frequently address the history of philosophy. …
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游牧学:“早期”德勒兹与哲学史
我属于这一代人,是最后的一代人之一,他们或多或少被哲学史用棍棒打死了。[…我们这一代的许多人从未摆脱过这种束缚;其他人则通过发明自己独特的方法和新规则,一种新的方法。我自己“研究”哲学史很长一段时间,读这个或那个作者的书。但我以各种方式进行了补偿:首先,我把注意力集中在这段历史上挑战理性主义传统的作家身上(我看到卢克莱修、休谟、斯宾诺莎和尼采之间存在着一种秘密联系,这种联系由他们对消极的批判、对快乐的培养、对权力的谴责……等等)。(1)黑格尔在《哲学史讲稿导言》中说:“哲学史向我们展示的是一群高尚的精神,是理性思维的英雄的画廊。”但是,如果把哲学史仅仅看作是意见的集合,哲学史本身就武断而毫无价值,那它就没有什么价值了。这里没有哲学观点。”(2)因此,黑格尔说,那些希望通过研究哲学史所包含的哲学家个体来理解哲学史的人,而不是对其思想的总体有一个更普遍的认识,那将是只见树木不见森林。“任何从观察树木开始,只盯着它们不放的人,都不会审视整个森林,而且会迷失在森林中,迷惑不解。”(3)对黑格尔来说,哲学史是哲学本身的总体概念和进化实现。先说一句:吉尔·德勒兹讨厌这段哲学史。事实上,他并不关心这个观点背后的哲学家和哲学:“我最讨厌的是黑格尔主义和辩证法。”(4)然而,德勒兹并没有抛弃或拒绝哲学史。相反,他把这个项目转变为另一种东西,一种“游牧学”,它投射出一种哲学史的另类,不仅允许德勒兹“走出”那个制度,而且允许我们以富有生产力的新方式重新想象它。德勒兹对哲学史的厌恶,对他和他的同代人在学校里提出的黑格尔制度的厌恶,形成了法国哲学专业的基本要求,被他对哲学史的独特方法所克服,这种方法在改造哲学的同时救赎了哲学。通常,任何关于德勒兹职业生涯的讨论都会在他的“早期”作品(1953年至1968年间出版的关于西方哲学史上个人人物的专著)和德勒兹的后期作品(如《差异与重复》和《感觉的逻辑》)(5)之间划一条线,随后是他在20世纪70年代与费利克斯·加塔里的合作,最后是他的各种后资本主义和精神分裂症著作,最终可能是《什么是哲学?》(也是与Guattari合著)。尽管德勒兹自己曾说过,他的早期作品致力于哲学史,但读过他全部作品的读者会注意到,激励这些早期研究的关注点仍然存在于他后来的作品中。此外,人们可以说,德勒兹从未真正停止“做”哲学史,尽管是以他自己相当古怪的方式。除了那些关于休谟、尼采、康德、柏格森、斯宾诺莎的早期专著之外,德勒兹还专门研究了哲学家莱布尼茨、福柯和他的老朋友弗朗索瓦·沙特莱,并与他的游牧思想家和哲学史上的其他人物在与瓜塔里的合作中保持着持续的对话,在他与文学的交往中(包括一本关于普鲁斯特的书和一篇关于萨切尔-马索克的长篇文章),(13)除了对卡夫卡的研究之外,在他关于电影和弗朗西斯·培根的书中,(14)仅列举书本长度的研究;他的散文和其他短篇作品经常涉及哲学史。…
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