CLIP: Continuous Location Integrity and Provenance for Mobile Phones

Abstract

Many location-based services require a mobile user to continuously prove his location. In absence of a secure mechanism, malicious users may lie about their locations to get these services. Mobility trace, a sequence of past mobility points, provides evidence for the user's locations. In this paper, we propose a Continuous Location Integrity and Provenance (CLIP) Scheme to provide authentication for mobility trace, and protect users' privacy. CLIP uses low-power inertial accelerometer sensor with a light-weight entropy-based commitment mechanism and is able to authenticate the user's mobility trace without any cost of trusted hardware. CLIP maintains the user's privacy, allowing the user to submit a portion of his mobility trace with which the commitment can be also verified. Wireless Access Points (APs) or colocated mobile devices are used to generate the location proofs. We also propose a light-weight spatial-temporal trust model to detect fake location proofs from collusion attacks. The prototype implementation on Android demonstrates that CLIP requires low computational and storage resources. Our extensive simulations show that the spatial-temporal trust model can achieve high (> 0.9) detection accuracy against collusion attacks.