When are Governmental Interventions into Freedom Constitutionally Legitimate?

C. Engel
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Abstract

The German constitution stands out for the exceptionally powerful position of the Constitutional Court. Any governmental intervention into freedom, and any unequal treatment, are constitutional issues. And any inhabitant can attack any administrative act, and any piece of legislation, in the Constitutional Court. The basic test is proportionality. Given the legislators', or the administrators', end the interference must be conducive, least intrusive, and not out of proportion. All three tests are relative. How powerful they are depends on the definition of the governmental aim. Unlike constitutional jurisprudence, doctrine is hesitant to say which governmental aims are constitutionally legitimate. The paper does two things: it reconstructs dogmatic principles for the definition of governmental aims from the jurisprudence, and it demonstrates how the quality of these definitions can be improved by relying on concepts from the social sciences, like the economic theory of market failure. Sceptics raise three concerns: there is no universally agreed philosophical starting point from which the legitimacy of governmental aims could deductively be derived; the Constitutional Court is ill prepared for engaging in the application of theories from the social sciences; strict dogmatic principles for the definition of legitimate aims siphon power away from the democratically elected legislator. The paper rebuts all three concerns.
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什么时候政府干预自由在宪法上是合法的?
德国宪法赋予宪法法院异常强大的地位。任何政府对自由的干预,任何不平等的待遇,都是宪法问题。任何居民都可以在宪法法院攻击任何行政行为和任何立法。基本的检验是比例。考虑到立法者或管理者的目的,干预必须是有益的,侵入性最小的,而不是不成比例的。这三个测试都是相对的。它们的权力有多大取决于政府目标的定义。与宪法学不同,理论对于政府的哪些目标在宪法上是合法的犹豫不决。本文做了两件事:从法理学角度重构了政府目标定义的教条原则,并论证了如何通过依赖社会科学的概念,如市场失灵的经济理论,来提高这些定义的质量。怀疑论者提出了三个问题:没有一个普遍认可的哲学起点,可以由此推导出政府目标的合法性;宪法法院在运用社会科学理论方面准备不足;定义合法目的的严格教条式原则剥夺了民主选举的立法者的权力。这篇论文驳斥了这三种担忧。
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