General Equilibrium Theory, but Better

Steven Kerr
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Abstract

I construct a general, game theoretic model of markets. Agents in the model choose how much of each good to supply/demand, and at what prices. Trading can occur at non-market-clearing prices. There is an explicit rationing mechanism that kicks in if markets fail to clear. The game is very complicated, but a massive simplification occurs in the limit of a large number of players. This allows a proof of existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. I also prove an analogue of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics.

The game is Keynesian in that 1) markets needn't clear at equilibrium so there can be unemployment and 2) there is the possibility of multiple equilibria with different levels of aggregate supply/demand, and distinct Pareto rankings. The model is microfounded and Keynesian. Fiat money can be accommodated as a store of value and a medium of exchange. The model is well placed for investigating dynamics.
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一般均衡理论,但更好
我构建了一个一般的市场博弈论模型。模型中的代理选择每种商品的供给/需求数量以及价格。交易可以以非市场出清价格进行。如果市场无法出清,就会启动明确的配给机制。这款游戏非常复杂,但在玩家数量的限制下会出现大量的简化。这就证明了纯策略均衡的存在性。我还证明了福利经济学第一基本定理的一个类比。这个博弈是凯恩斯主义的,因为1)市场不需要在均衡时出清,所以可能会有失业;2)有可能出现多种均衡,总供给/需求水平不同,帕累托排名也不同。这个模型是微观的,是凯恩斯主义的。法定货币可以作为一种价值储存手段和交换媒介。这个模型很适合研究动力学。
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