Social welfare of selfish agents: motivating efficiency for divisible resources

2004 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37601) Pub Date : 2004-12-01 DOI:10.1109/CDC.2004.1430264

R. Maheswaran, T. Başar

引用次数: 84

Abstract

In today's landscape of distributed and autonomous computing, there is a challenge to construct mechanisms which can induce selfish agents to act in a way that satisfies a global goal. In the domain for the allocation of computational and network resources, proportionally fair schemes are commonly advocated. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency of the resulting equilibria in such systems. We then develop a method of generating an entire class of divisible auctions with minimal signaling and computation costs which maximize social welfare even though agents act solely to optimize their own utility.

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

自私主体的社会福利:可分资源的效率激励

在当今分布式和自主计算的环境中，构建能够诱导自私代理以满足全局目标的方式行事的机制是一个挑战。在计算资源和网络资源的分配领域，通常提倡比例公平方案。在本文中，我们研究了在这种系统中所得到的均衡的效率。然后，我们开发了一种方法，以最小的信号和计算成本生成整个类别的可分割拍卖，即使代理人仅为优化自己的效用而行动，也能最大化社会福利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文去求助

来源期刊

2004 43rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37601)

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊最新文献

Remarks on strong stabilization and stable H/sup /spl infin// controller design Neural network compensation technique for standard PD-like fuzzy controlled nonlinear systems Failure-robust distributed controller architectures Stochastic optimal control guidance law with bounded acceleration On automating atomic force microscopes: an adaptive control approach