Intersubjetividade e ontologia social nas revisões da teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth

Luiz Philipe de Caux
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Abstract

The article synthesizes the revisions Axel Honneth imposed to his work after the critical reception of The Struggle for Recognition (1992) and proposes to unterstand them as intermediate steps towards the new critical model stabilized in Freedom's Right (2011), which Honneth calls normative reconstruction. The purpose is not to examine the methodical determinations of normative reconstruction, but to go through the intellectual path taken by Honneth between his two main books, making explicit the revisions and the new presuppositions of his “mature” work. These revisions, focused in an unterstanding of intersubjectivity and social ontology considered by Honneth as more adequate, sustain and justify the decisions of method of that latter book. Since the beginning of his theoretical work, Honneth had to deal with the objection of systematically commiting a kind of naturalistic fallacy as he sought the basis for a critical theory of society in the concrete experience of suffering. Even The Struggle for Recognition was still justifiably subjected to that same criticism, as Honneth himself admitted. I argue that the aim of the revisions carried out in the decade of 2000 was to solve that gap finding, on the one hand, an index of rationality internal to the very act of recognition and, on the other hand, an index of rationality present in the social norms and practices historically sedimented through relations of recognition
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阿克塞尔·霍尼思认知理论综述中的主体间性与社会本体论
本文综合了阿克塞尔·霍内斯(Axel Honneth)在《争取承认的斗争》(1992)被评论性接受后对其作品所做的修订,并建议将其理解为迈向《自由的权利》(2011)中稳定的新批评模式的中间步骤,霍内斯称之为规范重建。本文的目的并不是要考察规范重建的方法决定,而是要通过Honneth在他的两本主要著作之间所走过的思想道路,明确他的“成熟”作品的修订和新的前提。这些修订,集中在对主体间性和社会本体论的理解上,被Honneth认为是更充分的,支持并证明了后一本书中方法的决定。从他的理论工作开始,当他在具体的痛苦经验中寻求社会批判理论的基础时,他不得不处理系统地犯下一种自然主义谬误的反对意见。就像Honneth自己承认的那样,即使是《争取承认的斗争》也理所当然地受到了同样的批评。我认为,在2000年的十年中进行的修订的目的是解决差距发现,一方面,一个理性的指数内部的认识行为,另一方面,理性的指数存在于社会规范和实践的历史沉淀通过认识的关系
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