Pub Date : 2023-03-16DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2022e86707
Rodrigo Dornas de Oliveira, Thomas Da Rosa de Bustamante
{"title":"","authors":"Rodrigo Dornas de Oliveira, Thomas Da Rosa de Bustamante","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2022e86707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2022e86707","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135439612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80043
M. Azevedo, Bianca Andrade
How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness.
{"title":"The neuroethics of agency: the problem of attributing mental states to people with disorders of consciousness","authors":"M. Azevedo, Bianca Andrade","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80043","url":null,"abstract":"How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"325 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116300223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80042
Viviane Zarembski Braga
The aim of this article is to present some of the philosophical positions that dialogue with different areas of knowledge and that help us take a step further in the understanding of the relationship between reason and emotion. First, we present Damasio's idea of somatic-markers, which elucidates the role of affections in the development of rational thought. Second, we observe that these exhibit a reduced capacity in different spheres of life, with a decreased ability to connect negative components to moral norms, resulting in inappropriate moral behavior and interfering with deliberative capacities. Finally, we present Shaun Nichols' theory on Affective Resonance, the norms that comprise affective support (mainly negative) exhibit cultural transmission advantages to the detriment of affectively neutral norms. These studies prove the importance of affections inrational thinking and in the maintenance and propagation of moral norms and rules. The main idea defended herein is that a close relationship between reason and emotion takes place. By elucidating this relationship, we are able to deepen studies concerning the human condition, especially with regard to reason and morality.
{"title":"O papel dos afetos na vida humana","authors":"Viviane Zarembski Braga","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80042","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to present some of the philosophical positions that dialogue with different areas of knowledge and that help us take a step further in the understanding of the relationship between reason and emotion. First, we present Damasio's idea of somatic-markers, which elucidates the role of affections in the development of rational thought. Second, we observe that these exhibit a reduced capacity in different spheres of life, with a decreased ability to connect negative components to moral norms, resulting in inappropriate moral behavior and interfering with deliberative capacities. Finally, we present Shaun Nichols' theory on Affective Resonance, the norms that comprise affective support (mainly negative) exhibit cultural transmission advantages to the detriment of affectively neutral norms. These studies prove the importance of affections inrational thinking and in the maintenance and propagation of moral norms and rules. The main idea defended herein is that a close relationship between reason and emotion takes place. By elucidating this relationship, we are able to deepen studies concerning the human condition, especially with regard to reason and morality.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127793591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79812
Bárbara Buril, A. Pinzani
This paper departs from the assumption that the critique of neoliberalism should not restrict itself to a criticism of an economic project. Another possible criticism of neoliberalism consists of a critique of how this specific form of life forms subjects. In this paper, we argue that a critique of a form of life is only justified in a reasonable way if it starts from the experiences of suffering produced by this form of life. As we will show, we must criticise neoliberalism not because it is inadequate for solving problems, since for a specific portion of the world population it has been extremely effective, but because it causes suffering. Suffering, unlike mere unsolved problems, represents sufficient grounds for highlighting the existence of a normative problem in a form of life. According to Max Horkheimer, the first step of a critical project committed to the transformation of a form of life are the crises of the present, which are not fully understood through the theoretical tools of “problem solving” or “learning processes”, as Rahel Jaeggi resorts to in her critical theory of society.
{"title":"For an immanent critique of a neoliberal form of life","authors":"Bárbara Buril, A. Pinzani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79812","url":null,"abstract":"This paper departs from the assumption that the critique of neoliberalism should not restrict itself to a criticism of an economic project. Another possible criticism of neoliberalism consists of a critique of how this specific form of life forms subjects. In this paper, we argue that a critique of a form of life is only justified in a reasonable way if it starts from the experiences of suffering produced by this form of life. As we will show, we must criticise neoliberalism not because it is inadequate for solving problems, since for a specific portion of the world population it has been extremely effective, but because it causes suffering. Suffering, unlike mere unsolved problems, represents sufficient grounds for highlighting the existence of a normative problem in a form of life. According to Max Horkheimer, the first step of a critical project committed to the transformation of a form of life are the crises of the present, which are not fully understood through the theoretical tools of “problem solving” or “learning processes”, as Rahel Jaeggi resorts to in her critical theory of society.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125579204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79342
Fernanda Belo Gontijo
It is widely known among ethicists that Mill’s moral theory is utilitarianism. It is not a consensus, however, what is the kind of utilitarianism he actually defended, if an act- or rule-utilitarianism. This paper aims to present the grounds for such dispute and supports that Mill is an act-utilitarian.
{"title":"Por que interpretar a teoria ética de Mill como um tipo de utilitarismo de atos","authors":"Fernanda Belo Gontijo","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79342","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely known among ethicists that Mill’s moral theory is utilitarianism. It is not a consensus, however, what is the kind of utilitarianism he actually defended, if an act- or rule-utilitarianism. This paper aims to present the grounds for such dispute and supports that Mill is an act-utilitarian.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114904854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80051
A. Bonella, G. Almeida, L. Almada
This paper aims to examine in a conceptual and reasonably well-informed manner from a scientific point of view, the interrelationship between mental vulnerability and rational and autonomous decision-making capacity, presenting relevant bioethical aspects, based on this examination, but also, based on consolidated ethical principles, to reflect and deliberate on the relevance of research with people affected by major mental disorders in psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience in general. After highlighting general ethical aspects of ethics in research with human beings, the paper examines whether individuals with major mental disorders, such as major depressive disorder, can be considered effectively rational, autonomous and responsible, if they are endowed with rational responsible autonomy. Finally, we highlight bioethical aspects related to vulnerability and practical rationality related to the theme. The various theoretical and practical aspects highlighted here seem crucial, and suggest the outline of questions and concepts that need to be further explored by the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience.
{"title":"Ética das pesquisas envolvendo pessoas com transtornos mentais maiores","authors":"A. Bonella, G. Almeida, L. Almada","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E80051","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to examine in a conceptual and reasonably well-informed manner from a scientific point of view, the interrelationship between mental vulnerability and rational and autonomous decision-making capacity, presenting relevant bioethical aspects, based on this examination, but also, based on consolidated ethical principles, to reflect and deliberate on the relevance of research with people affected by major mental disorders in psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience in general. After highlighting general ethical aspects of ethics in research with human beings, the paper examines whether individuals with major mental disorders, such as major depressive disorder, can be considered effectively rational, autonomous and responsible, if they are endowed with rational responsible autonomy. Finally, we highlight bioethical aspects related to vulnerability and practical rationality related to the theme. The various theoretical and practical aspects highlighted here seem crucial, and suggest the outline of questions and concepts that need to be further explored by the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics of neuroscience.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127496956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79592
T. Torriani
Music therapy has been proven useful in the treatment of a wide range of disorders, even if often in only an auxiliary role. Its use for patients requiring neurological rehabilitation is rather recent and its effectiveness has been assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Practitioners must undergo rigorous training to obtain certification and must be able to combine a high level of therapeutic and artistic skills. As members of multidisciplinary teams, music therapists are expected to (1) justify their participation by employing the most effective methods at their disposal; (2) adapt or even create musical material best suited to patients’ needs; and (3) strive for a theoretical understanding of what their intervention is trying accomplish. These recommendations emerge from concrete realities that we could not take cognizance of purely a priori. An attempt to ground them post hoc in an abstract universal conception of human dignity realized in Kant’s practical reason, attractive as that might seem philosophically, is ridden with logical gaps (non-sequiturs) and circularity (Rorty). Moral concepts ought rather to be understood as impure a priori criteria for moral judgment acquired and negotiated through linguistic socialization (Herder, Piaget, Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, Habermas). The collective construction of a future neuroethics makes sense as a humanitarian plea (Herder’s Humanitat) following the jurisprudential practice of English common law rather than the top-down imposition of a global civil code. In so far as music therapy is concerned, it will most likely remain embedded in the moral anthropological context of local languages, cultures and traditions, albeit with some foreign influences caused by international exchange.
{"title":"Ethical recommendations for music therapy in neurorehabilitation: impure a priori foundations and transpersonal holism","authors":"T. Torriani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79592","url":null,"abstract":"Music therapy has been proven useful in the treatment of a wide range of disorders, even if often in only an auxiliary role. Its use for patients requiring neurological rehabilitation is rather recent and its effectiveness has been assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Practitioners must undergo rigorous training to obtain certification and must be able to combine a high level of therapeutic and artistic skills. As members of multidisciplinary teams, music therapists are expected to (1) justify their participation by employing the most effective methods at their disposal; (2) adapt or even create musical material best suited to patients’ needs; and (3) strive for a theoretical understanding of what their intervention is trying accomplish. These recommendations emerge from concrete realities that we could not take cognizance of purely a priori. An attempt to ground them post hoc in an abstract universal conception of human dignity realized in Kant’s practical reason, attractive as that might seem philosophically, is ridden with logical gaps (non-sequiturs) and circularity (Rorty). Moral concepts ought rather to be understood as impure a priori criteria for moral judgment acquired and negotiated through linguistic socialization (Herder, Piaget, Vygotsky, Wittgenstein, Habermas). The collective construction of a future neuroethics makes sense as a humanitarian plea (Herder’s Humanitat) following the jurisprudential practice of English common law rather than the top-down imposition of a global civil code. In so far as music therapy is concerned, it will most likely remain embedded in the moral anthropological context of local languages, cultures and traditions, albeit with some foreign influences caused by international exchange.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124347107","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79185
Richard C Playford
Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.
{"title":"Non-natural natural law: bridging the gap between Aristotle and Ross","authors":"Richard C Playford","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79185","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotelianism is often considered to be a version of naturalism. As a result, non-naturalism is often considered to be incompatible with Aristotelianism. In this paper, I will show that the Aristotelian can actually accept much of what the non-naturalist wants to say. I will show that the Aristotelian can accept a non-natural account of the good, need not be concerned by G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument and that, as long as we carefully consider and define our terms, they can accept much of non-naturalism in abstract. This then paves the way for the possibility of a non-natural natural law and should go some way to challenging the prevailing orthodoxy that Aristotelianism is a version of naturalism. I do not go so far as to label Aristotelianism a form of non-naturalism as there are some important areas of disagreement. Instead, I think that Aristotelianism should count as its own label and that it will resist any attempts to label it a form of naturalism, non-naturalism or, indeed, supernaturalism.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128527272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78304
Lamont Rodgers
Eric Mack defends a version of John Locke’s proviso. Mack applies his proviso to original appropriations, uses, and systems of private property. His proviso precludes severely disabling the world-interactive powers of others. Mack specifically warns against using concrete features of the natural world as a baseline for determine whether the proviso has been violated. While his proviso is plausible, I argue that he cannot. eschew employing the receptivity of the natural, unowned world to the extent that he suggests. We cannot determine whether one’s powers are disabled or diminished without knowing how receptive the world would be to those powers had a system of private property not arisen. The upshot of this paper is that the requirements of a well-formulated proviso is an empirical matter.
{"title":"The role of nature in the self-ownership proviso","authors":"Lamont Rodgers","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E78304","url":null,"abstract":"Eric Mack defends a version of John Locke’s proviso. Mack applies his proviso to original appropriations, uses, and systems of private property. His proviso precludes severely disabling the world-interactive powers of others. Mack specifically warns against using concrete features of the natural world as a baseline for determine whether the proviso has been violated. While his proviso is plausible, I argue that he cannot. eschew employing the receptivity of the natural, unowned world to the extent that he suggests. We cannot determine whether one’s powers are disabled or diminished without knowing how receptive the world would be to those powers had a system of private property not arisen. The upshot of this paper is that the requirements of a well-formulated proviso is an empirical matter.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122512741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79970
Matheus de Mesquita Silveira
The past few years have seen a great deal of conceptual and empirical research on empathy, in addition to a growing public interest in the topic. In this context, the academic and public spheres often use empathy and morality interchangeably. In this article, it will be argued that there is a relationship between both, but with different levels of overlap. The problem lies in the contemporary breadth of the concept of empathy and its consequent polysemy. In the presented argument, it will be relevant to distinguish different characteristics of emotional attachment, especially, emotional resonance, empathic concern, and perspective-taking. The conceptual distinction will follow an empirical-materialist line: different embodied phenomena need specific conceptual definitions. After all, each of these psychobiological processes influences normative judgments in a particular way that incurs different forms of social behavior. The plurality of discoveries in cognitive sciences will illustrate the complex and ambiguous relationship regarding the definition of empathy. The central point to understand this relationship will be the defense of greater conceptual precision about the phenomena of emotional attachment associated with morality.
{"title":"Problemas no uso de empatia em investigações sobre o comportamento moral","authors":"Matheus de Mesquita Silveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.E79970","url":null,"abstract":"The past few years have seen a great deal of conceptual and empirical research on empathy, in addition to a growing public interest in the topic. In this context, the academic and public spheres often use empathy and morality interchangeably. In this article, it will be argued that there is a relationship between both, but with different levels of overlap. The problem lies in the contemporary breadth of the concept of empathy and its consequent polysemy. In the presented argument, it will be relevant to distinguish different characteristics of emotional attachment, especially, emotional resonance, empathic concern, and perspective-taking. The conceptual distinction will follow an empirical-materialist line: different embodied phenomena need specific conceptual definitions. After all, each of these psychobiological processes influences normative judgments in a particular way that incurs different forms of social behavior. The plurality of discoveries in cognitive sciences will illustrate the complex and ambiguous relationship regarding the definition of empathy. The central point to understand this relationship will be the defense of greater conceptual precision about the phenomena of emotional attachment associated with morality.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128741360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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