Research on differentiated pricing polices of closed loop supply chains with manufacturer collection mode considering power structure and risk aversion

S. Hao, Da Qingli
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of channel power structure and participants' risk-averse attitude on differentiated pricing policies of closed-loop supply chains. It is assumed that the manufacturer is risk-averse and the retailer is risk-neutral. The manufacturer's expected utility function and the retailer's expected profit function are obtained by mean-variance theory. Then the differentiated pricing policies and profit allocation problem are discussed under three channel power structures: manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS), retailer-Stackelberg (RS) and Vertical Nash (VN) equilibrium. The optimal wholesale prices, retail prices and production quantities of new manufactured products and remanufactured products are derived and compared under different cases. Finally numerical analysis of risk-averse degree on participants' profits is given. The study has shown that the VN mode yields the best closed-loop supply chain performances, and then is the MS mode, the worst is the RS supply chain.
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考虑权力结构和风险规避的制造商集合模式下闭环供应链差异化定价政策研究
本文研究了渠道权力结构和参与者风险厌恶态度对闭环供应链差异化定价政策的影响。假设制造商是风险厌恶者,零售商是风险中性者。利用均值-方差理论得到了制造商的期望效用函数和零售商的期望利润函数。然后讨论了制造商- stackelberg (MS)、零售商- stackelberg (RS)和垂直纳什均衡(VN)三种渠道权力结构下的差异化定价政策和利润分配问题。推导并比较了不同情况下新制造品和再制造品的最优批发价格、零售价格和生产数量。最后给出了参与者利润的风险厌恶程度的数值分析。研究表明,VN模式的闭环供应链绩效最好,MS模式次之,RS模式最差。
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