Is Contempt Redeemable?

Abstract

In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target. Contempt has had a bad name in philosophy. However objectionable a person’s character or behavior, philosophers have tended to follow Kant in proscribing contempt as "incompatible with a fundamental duty of respect" (Hill 2000, 88). Recently, however, there have been attempts at rehabilitation of nasty emotions in general: there have been pleas for shame (Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni 2011), jealousy (Kristjáánsson 2002), and other "shadowy emotions" (Tappolet, Teroni, and Ziv 2018). Contempt is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "the holding or treating as of little account, or as vile and worthless; the mental attitude in which a thing is so considered." It is widely regarded as a nasty emotion that cannot be morally justified. Two objections, traceable to Kant, have been adduced against it. The first is that it embraces a whole person globally and not merely some deed or local aspect of a person’s character. The second is that contempt amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target. The two are closely related: targeting "the sin, not the sinner" seems compatible with retaining a basic respect for the latter. But an