An Experiment in Candidate Selection

K. Casey, A. B. Kamara, N. Meriggi
{"title":"An Experiment in Candidate Selection","authors":"K. Casey, A. B. Kamara, N. Meriggi","doi":"10.3386/w26160","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. (JEL D72, H41, O17)","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26160","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15

Abstract

Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits, like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination, at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters’ most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. (JEL D72, H41, O17)
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
候选人选择的实验
是普通公民还是政党领导人更有资格选择候选人?虽然美国的初选制度让公民选择,但大多数民主国家依靠政党官员任命或提名候选人。这些截然不同的设计选择的后果尚不清楚:虽然官员们通常更了解候选人的资格,但他们可能会看重一些特征,比如对政党的忠诚或为提名付费的意愿,这与确定表现最好的人不一致。我们与塞拉利昂的两个主要政党合作,实验性地改变选民在选择议会候选人时的发言权。估计表明,更民主的程序增加了政党选择选民最喜欢的候选人的可能性,并倾向于在公共产品提供方面有更强记录的候选人。(jel 72, h41, o17)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Apartheid Crises, Catharses, and Boiling Frogs: Path Dependence in Collective Action The Common Good and Voter Polarization Voting for Compromises: Alternative Voting Methods in Polarized Societies Influência de Messias? Relação Intramunicipal entre Preferências Políticas e Mortes em uma Pandemia (Messias’ Influence? Intra-Municipal Relationship between Political Preferences and Deaths in a Pandemic)
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1