Apartheid was an array of racist laws governing South Africa from the election of the National Party in 1948 until the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. Apartheid's codified racism required discrimination, violated the rights of individuals as individuals, and shackled the South African economy for the transitory benefit of special interests. Apartheid combined mercantilism, colonialism, nationalism, and socialism with racism to produce a constellation of oppressive institutions that cost the country dearly in blood and treasure by limiting its potential to develop internally and eventually leading to its isolation from international markets
{"title":"Apartheid","authors":"Art Carden, C. Lingle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3914266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3914266","url":null,"abstract":"Apartheid was an array of racist laws governing South Africa from the election of the National Party in 1948 until the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. Apartheid's codified racism required discrimination, violated the rights of individuals as individuals, and shackled the South African economy for the transitory benefit of special interests. Apartheid combined mercantilism, colonialism, nationalism, and socialism with racism to produce a constellation of oppressive institutions that cost the country dearly in blood and treasure by limiting its potential to develop internally and eventually leading to its isolation from international markets","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127081457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show a strong form of path-dependence in collective action. For a given distribution of anti-regime grievances and sentiments in the society, the size of the protest is larger when this distribution of grievances is the result of a sudden large change rather than a series of smaller unexpected changes. Society as a whole behaves like the legendary boiling frog, even though each individual does not. Large grievance shocks (crises) coordinate behavior far more effectively into revolts than a sequence of small shocks that generate the same final distribution of grievances. Our analysis applies advances in incomplete information coordination games (Morris and Yildiz 2019), deviating from the literature by relying only on the notion of rationalizability (as opposed to Nash equilibrium) and assuming heavy-tailed distributions of grievance shocks. We explore the unexpected link between this theory and Davies's (1962) classic J-curve theory of revolution.
我们在集体行动中表现出强烈的路径依赖形式。对于社会中反政权的不满和情绪的给定分布，当这种不满的分布是突然的大变化而不是一系列较小的意外变化的结果时，抗议的规模会更大。社会作为一个整体的行为就像传说中的煮青蛙，尽管每个人都不是。大规模的不满冲击(危机)比一系列产生相同不满最终分配的小冲击更有效地协调行为，从而形成反抗。我们的分析应用了不完全信息协调博弈的进展(Morris and Yildiz 2019)，偏离了文献，只依赖于合理化的概念(而不是纳什均衡)，并假设了不满冲击的重尾分布。我们探索了这一理论与戴维斯(1962)经典的j曲线革命理论之间意想不到的联系。
{"title":"Crises, Catharses, and Boiling Frogs: Path Dependence in Collective Action","authors":"Sofía Correa, G. Nandong, Mehdi Shadmehr","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3906282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3906282","url":null,"abstract":"We show a strong form of path-dependence in collective action. For a given distribution of anti-regime grievances and sentiments in the society, the size of the protest is larger when this distribution of grievances is the result of a sudden large change rather than a series of smaller unexpected changes. Society as a whole behaves like the legendary boiling frog, even though each individual does not. Large grievance shocks (crises) coordinate behavior far more effectively into revolts than a sequence of small shocks that generate the same final distribution of grievances. Our analysis applies advances in incomplete information coordination games (Morris and Yildiz 2019), deviating from the literature by relying only on the notion of rationalizability (as opposed to Nash equilibrium) and assuming heavy-tailed distributions of grievance shocks. We explore the unexpected link between this theory and Davies's (1962) classic J-curve theory of revolution.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"149 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122342686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Do voters see democracy entirely as a game of self-interest in which one person’s gain is another’s loss, or do they also view it as a search for the common good, as some democracy theorists have long conjectured? Existing empirical research that assumes entirely private interests cannot answer this question, by design. We develop an empirical model in which voters derive utility from both common-good and private considerations, and show formally how to disentangle the two preference components. We estimate the model on California ballot propositions from 1986 to 2020, and find that 46 to 87 percent of voters place significant weight on the common-good aspects of proposals. Common-good concerns mitigate the effects of voter polarization, which we find substantially increased over out study period - particularly in the last six years.
{"title":"The Common Good and Voter Polarization","authors":"J. Matsusaka, Chad Kendall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3868589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3868589","url":null,"abstract":"Do voters see democracy entirely as a game of self-interest in which one person’s gain is another’s loss, or do they also view it as a search for the common good, as some democracy theorists have long conjectured? Existing empirical research that assumes entirely private interests cannot answer this question, by design. We develop an empirical model in which voters derive utility from both common-good and private considerations, and show formally how to disentangle the two preference components. We estimate the model on California ballot propositions from 1986 to 2020, and find that 46 to 87 percent of voters place significant weight on the common-good aspects of proposals. Common-good concerns mitigate the effects of voter polarization, which we find substantially increased over out study period - particularly in the last six years.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115903653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge election outcomes that affect everybody’s lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic arguments as efficiency are available, polarized societies might fail to select them. We demonstrate that part of the problem might be purely technical and, hence, potentially solvable. We study different voting methods in three experiments (total N = 5, 820), including small, medium-sized, and large electorates, and find that currently-used methods (Plurality Voting and Rank-Order systems) can lead voters to overwhelmingly support egoistic options. In contrast, alternative, more nuanced methods (Approval Voting and Borda Count) reduce the support for egoistic options and favor equity and efficiency, avoiding extreme outcomes. Those methods differ in whether they favor equity or efficiency when the latter benefits a majority. Our evidence suggests that targeted changes in the electoral system could favor socially-desirable compromises and increase social stability.
{"title":"Voting for Compromises: Alternative Voting Methods in Polarized Societies","authors":"Carlos Alós-Ferrer, J. Buckenmaier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3915687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3915687","url":null,"abstract":"Democratic societies have been increasingly confronted with extreme, knife-edge election outcomes that affect everybody’s lives and contribute to social instability. Even if political compromises based on social conventions as equity or economic arguments as efficiency are available, polarized societies might fail to select them. We demonstrate that part of the problem might be purely technical and, hence, potentially solvable. We study different voting methods in three experiments (total N = 5, 820), including small, medium-sized, and large electorates, and find that currently-used methods (Plurality Voting and Rank-Order systems) can lead voters to overwhelmingly support egoistic options. In contrast, alternative, more nuanced methods (Approval Voting and Borda Count) reduce the support for egoistic options and favor equity and efficiency, avoiding extreme outcomes. Those methods differ in whether they favor equity or efficiency when the latter benefits a majority. Our evidence suggests that targeted changes in the electoral system could favor socially-desirable compromises and increase social stability.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131397737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Previous studies have shown that the percentage of votes for Jair Messias Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential elections, at the municipal and state levels, is related to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the number of deaths. We find the same effects at the intra- -municipal level in the city of São Paulo. Using geolocation, we associate voting data with number of deaths for the 96 districts in the city. We analyze excess mortality to mitigate underreporting issues and to account for exogenous determinants of mortality, as well as control for age structure and several indicators of socioeconomic vulnerability. The results are significant and indicate the existence of a relationship between votes for Bolsonaro and deaths during the pandemic — between one and five additional deaths per 100k people for each percentage point of votes. Several robustness checks support our findings.
{"title":"Influência de Messias? Relação Intramunicipal entre Preferências Políticas e Mortes em uma Pandemia (Messias’ Influence? Intra-Municipal Relationship between Political Preferences and Deaths in a Pandemic)","authors":"G. Figueira, Luca Moreno-Louzada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3849383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3849383","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Previous studies have shown that the percentage of votes for Jair Messias Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential elections, at the municipal and state levels, is related to the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the number of deaths. We find the same effects at the intra- -municipal level in the city of São Paulo. Using geolocation, we associate voting data with number of deaths for the 96 districts in the city. We analyze excess mortality to mitigate underreporting issues and to account for exogenous determinants of mortality, as well as control for age structure and several indicators of socioeconomic vulnerability. The results are significant and indicate the existence of a relationship between votes for Bolsonaro and deaths during the pandemic — between one and five additional deaths per 100k people for each percentage point of votes. Several robustness checks support our findings.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132872505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With present (2021) tally rules, the number of seats in the Bundestag is highly volatile. In 2017 it got 709 seats, 111 of them extra-ordinary. The rules may double the influence of a voter who splits the ballot, contrary to a goal of equal influence; increased assembly size is a concomitant. The paper explains when and how this happens.
A ballot’s combination of Erststimme and Zweitstimme is information now ignored; the tally is as if they were collected in separate ballot boxes. Faithful accounting requires this information, but there is strong reason to expect it will reduce the 2017 assembly size to the ordinary 598 seats stated in the Federal Elections Act. Tallying 2017 votes with the present rules, but with CDU&CSU as a recognized coalition, reduces the size by 41 seats.
{"title":"Mixed Member Proportional with Faithful Accounting","authors":"E. Stensholt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3804724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804724","url":null,"abstract":"With present (2021) tally rules, the number of seats in the Bundestag is highly volatile. In 2017 it got 709 seats, 111 of them extra-ordinary. The rules may double the influence of a voter who splits the ballot, contrary to a goal of equal influence; increased assembly size is a concomitant. The paper explains when and how this happens.<br><br>A ballot’s combination of Erststimme and Zweitstimme is information now ignored; the tally is as if they were collected in separate ballot boxes. Faithful accounting requires this information, but there is strong reason to expect it will reduce the 2017 assembly size to the ordinary 598 seats stated in the Federal Elections Act. Tallying 2017 votes with the present rules, but with CDU&CSU as a recognized coalition, reduces the size by 41 seats.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130086486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses election forecasting in the Caribbean through the reflective lens of model-based election forecasting in Jamaica between 2015 and 2020 to chart the progress made and to increase public understanding of the issues. Poll-based election forecasting is the dominant modality throughout the Caribbean. Since the death of Carl Stone in Jamaica, polls have been sometimes inaccurate because of methodological limitations. The major parties sometimes do not trust local pollsters. The thriving election forecasting business in the region provided the opportunity to employ other Caribbean pollsters. Model based election forecasting was introduced in Jamaica to complement poll-based forecasting. The model- based election forecasts in 2016 were inaccurate because the JLP tax plan was underestimated. The models used to accurately forecast the 2020 General Election shows that the state of the economy, the state of security, and what the party leaders are like (what they do) are very important to voters. There are historical, political, economic and social similarities between the Caribbean and Latin America so panel data on the macro-economy, homicide and leadership can also be used to forecast elections in these regions despite some major differences.
{"title":"Election Forecasting in the Caribbean: Reflections from Jamaica 2015-2020","authors":"Christopher A. D. Charles","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3776949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776949","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses election forecasting in the Caribbean through the reflective lens of model-based election forecasting in Jamaica between 2015 and 2020 to chart the progress made and to increase public understanding of the issues. Poll-based election forecasting is the dominant modality throughout the Caribbean. Since the death of Carl Stone in Jamaica, polls have been sometimes inaccurate because of methodological limitations. The major parties sometimes do not trust local pollsters. The thriving election forecasting business in the region provided the opportunity to employ other Caribbean pollsters. Model based election forecasting was introduced in Jamaica to complement poll-based forecasting. The model- based election forecasts in 2016 were inaccurate because the JLP tax plan was underestimated. The models used to accurately forecast the 2020 General Election shows that the state of the economy, the state of security, and what the party leaders are like (what they do) are very important to voters. There are historical, political, economic and social similarities between the Caribbean and Latin America so panel data on the macro-economy, homicide and leadership can also be used to forecast elections in these regions despite some major differences.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133958194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the dynamic nature of voting in modern elections with wide voting windows. Our stylized two-period model predicts that, if voters are not myopic, turnout in the current period tends to increase as the costs in the other period increase. The model also produces a surprising prediction that overall turnout can increase even when the costs increase. We test these predictions using novel data from Japan's General Election in 2017 with a weather disruption caused by a powerful typhoon. Our analyses show that the tremendous costs on Election Day shifted the timing of voting and did not decrease overall turnout in 2017, as compared to 2014. Our model and findings build a new benchmark to understand how voters decide their timing of voting. This study also has implications for the unprecedented popularity of early voting in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
{"title":"Dynamic Voting","authors":"Shuhei Kitamura, T. Matsubayashi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3630064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630064","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the dynamic nature of voting in modern elections with wide voting windows. Our stylized two-period model predicts that, if voters are not myopic, turnout in the current period tends to increase as the costs in the other period increase. The model also produces a surprising prediction that overall turnout can increase even when the costs increase. We test these predictions using novel data from Japan's General Election in 2017 with a weather disruption caused by a powerful typhoon. Our analyses show that the tremendous costs on Election Day shifted the timing of voting and did not decrease overall turnout in 2017, as compared to 2014. Our model and findings build a new benchmark to understand how voters decide their timing of voting. This study also has implications for the unprecedented popularity of early voting in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114768275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Adeabah, Charles Andoh, S. Asongu, I. Akomea-Frimpong
We examine the relationship between elections, political connections, and cash holdings in Ghanaian local assemblies. Using a panel dataset of 179local assemblies over a period 2012 to 2017, a panel regression and the generalized method of moments estimation techniques was employed for the analysis. We find that local assemblies hold less cash during election years, which suggests that election may be one of the potential factors to mitigate agency conflict in weak governance environment. Further, we demonstrate that local assemblies that have political connections hold less cash; however, political uncertainty makes these entities conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers because they hold more cash. Additional analysis indicates that one year prior to elections, managerial conservatism kicks-in and leads managers to hold more cash in local assemblies that have political connections, which continues and becomes more pronounced in election years. Our results have implications for regulations on the cash management practices of local assemblies.
{"title":"Elections, Political Connections and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Local Assemblies","authors":"David Adeabah, Charles Andoh, S. Asongu, I. Akomea-Frimpong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3765924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765924","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relationship between elections, political connections, and cash holdings in Ghanaian local assemblies. Using a panel dataset of 179local assemblies over a period 2012 to 2017, a panel regression and the generalized method of moments estimation techniques was employed for the analysis. We find that local assemblies hold less cash during election years, which suggests that election may be one of the potential factors to mitigate agency conflict in weak governance environment. Further, we demonstrate that local assemblies that have political connections hold less cash; however, political uncertainty makes these entities conducive to agency problems than their non-connected peers because they hold more cash. Additional analysis indicates that one year prior to elections, managerial conservatism kicks-in and leads managers to hold more cash in local assemblies that have political connections, which continues and becomes more pronounced in election years. Our results have implications for regulations on the cash management practices of local assemblies.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125059382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Replacing coal with cleaner energy carriers is a crucial lever to reach the Paris climate targets. However, as coal decline results in local job loss, political backlash might arise, jeopardizing the clean energy transition. Yet, we lack evidence on whether such backlash exists. Here, we analyze the electoral response to coal mining job losses in the United States presidential elections from 2000 to 2016 in a panel regression and a matched difference-in-difference setting. Our results suggest an electoral response in the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections specific to the loss of coal mining jobs. We estimate an increased Republican vote share of 1.2 pp in 2012 and 1.5 pp in 2016 for each 100 coal mining jobs lost. The estimated electoral response is thus almost five times as large as the numbers of jobs lost. We observe this response only in places with large job losses, where these jobs account for a large share of locally available jobs and where income levels are low. Existing relative party strengths, however, do not influence the results. Moreover, we find a spillover effect of 2.2 pp in 2016 into counties within 50 km of those affected by coal decline. We discuss the implications of these findings for coal phase-outs worldwide.
{"title":"Electoral Response to the Decline of Coal Mining in the United States","authors":"F. Egli, N. Schmid, T. Schmidt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710589","url":null,"abstract":"Replacing coal with cleaner energy carriers is a crucial lever to reach the Paris climate targets. However, as coal decline results in local job loss, political backlash might arise, jeopardizing the clean energy transition. Yet, we lack evidence on whether such backlash exists. Here, we analyze the electoral response to coal mining job losses in the United States presidential elections from 2000 to 2016 in a panel regression and a matched difference-in-difference setting. Our results suggest an electoral response in the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections specific to the loss of coal mining jobs. We estimate an increased Republican vote share of 1.2 pp in 2012 and 1.5 pp in 2016 for each 100 coal mining jobs lost. The estimated electoral response is thus almost five times as large as the numbers of jobs lost. We observe this response only in places with large job losses, where these jobs account for a large share of locally available jobs and where income levels are low. Existing relative party strengths, however, do not influence the results. Moreover, we find a spillover effect of 2.2 pp in 2016 into counties within 50 km of those affected by coal decline. We discuss the implications of these findings for coal phase-outs worldwide.","PeriodicalId":117783,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129838979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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