{"title":"The End of the Great Inversion: Offshore National Champion Banks and the Global Financial Crisis","authors":"Daniel Haberly, D. Wójcik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3280497","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Here we present a novel analysis of the development of offshore banking since 1980, which addresses important but still - unanswered questions about the both the role of offshore centers in the global financial crisis, and the post-crisis stability of these centers. We show that post-1980 regulatory shifts prompted a “Great Inversion” of offshore banking, from the old foreign-bank-hosting model, to a new “offshore national champion bank” model. As a result, offshore jurisdictions 1) were - counterintuitively - likely more responsible for pre-crisis regulatory failures in a home than host regulator capacity, and 2) internalized far greater domestic fiscal risks than in previous crises.","PeriodicalId":405783,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Financial Institutions (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3280497","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Here we present a novel analysis of the development of offshore banking since 1980, which addresses important but still - unanswered questions about the both the role of offshore centers in the global financial crisis, and the post-crisis stability of these centers. We show that post-1980 regulatory shifts prompted a “Great Inversion” of offshore banking, from the old foreign-bank-hosting model, to a new “offshore national champion bank” model. As a result, offshore jurisdictions 1) were - counterintuitively - likely more responsible for pre-crisis regulatory failures in a home than host regulator capacity, and 2) internalized far greater domestic fiscal risks than in previous crises.