A Note on the Size of Trading Blocs, Market Power and World Welfare Effects

Winston W. Chang, Tai-liang Chen, Tetsuya Saito
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

We prove that the normalization rule in Bond and Syropoulos (1996, Journal of International Economics 40, 411-437) that sets the world price of good 1 as the numeraire causes asymmetry in the Nash equilibrium. Such rule contradicts their symmetric assumption when one derives other blocs' optimum tariffs from their viewpoints. We further show that under symmetry their results are consistent only in the case of two trading blocs.
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贸易集团的规模、市场力量和世界福利效应
我们证明了Bond and Syropoulos (1996, Journal of International Economics 40, 411-437)中以商品1的世界价格为数值的归一化规则导致纳什均衡中的不对称性。当人们从其他集团的观点推导出最优关税时,这一规则与他们的对称假设相矛盾。我们进一步证明,在对称条件下,它们的结果只在两个贸易集团的情况下是一致的。
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