{"title":"“But why must readers be made to feel. . . .”: Repulsing Readerly Sympathy for Ethical Ends in the Victorian Realist Novel","authors":"Heidi L. Pennington","doi":"10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20138195","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Scholars have paid substantial attention to questions of readerly sympathy with and compassion for fictional characters in conversations about affect in the Victorian novel. Both Victorian and contemporary critics of the novel have proposed that this type of identification with fiction is in itself a mode of ethical engagement with the real world, even if the precise dynamics of this relation remain unclear. Rachel Ablow's comments reflect that, although there is a widely held belief that fiction can have a potent effect in the extratextual world, the connection between world and text remains a rather tenuous one: \"[t]he exact means by which novels were thought to instruct or influence readers varied widely. But the novel's ability to encourage sympathy was consistently identified as central to its effectiveness.\" (1) Mary-Catherine Harrison, attempting to clarify this relationship, traces a causal trajectory between novel-reading and ethical behavior in the real world this way: \"readers engage in a metaphorical, or what we might call synechdocal, interpretation of character: taking the part (individual) to refer to the whole (group). In this way, readers' emotional responses to fictional individuals can be parlayed into an emotional and ethical response towards groups of people whom they represent.\" (2) Writing primarily on Charles Dickens, Harrison points out that \"his vivid portraits of fictional suffering were coupled with epistemological claims of their accurate and faithful relationship to modern society\"; in this way, Harrison suggests, Dickens' work moves to resolve the \"non-interventionism inherent to the paradox of fiction: readers might not be able to intervene in characters' lives, but they can intervene on behalf of someone 'like' them.\" (3) Harrison's equation of feeling with action (4) implicitly relies not just on the idea that fictional characters are \"like\" or similar to real people in the world, but also on the notion that readers must like--that is, feel positively about--those fictional characters in order for them to desire to \"intervene on behalf of their counterparts in the reader's own reference world. I find Harrison's arguments about realism's ethical aspirations and methodologies convincing. However, some key questions remain: just because readers could act in their own world based on feelings of sympathy for a fiction, does it necessarily follow that they do or did act upon those feelings? Is direct real-world action the only measure of ethical efficacy in fiction? And, most pertinently to the present analysis, what happens when readers do not like or identify with a work's fictional protagonists--do these feelings of aversion foreclose the possibility of positive ethical outcomes beyond the text? The first two questions have already informed the work of many critics, most notably Suzanne Keen's 2007 monograph Empathy and the Novel, and they will guide the present essay as context for my argument. However, whether fiction directly inspires ethical action in readers and whether this should be the ultimate arbiter of fiction's moral value are matters too complex and too significant to be resolved here--or perhaps in any single venue. I limit my own analysis, therefore, to probing the interpretive, affective, and ethical possibilities of a text that refuses to inspire the usual sympathy for its protagonists. Specifically, I consider Anthony Trollope's 1869 novel He Knew He Was Right as a case study in how particular formal, narrative elements--namely, targeted disnarration--may generate readerly revulsion. I argue that the negative emotional effect of this text might represent another mode of realizing the realist novel's ethical charge; more particularly, its pattern of disnarration could force the readers' thwarted desire for narrative resolution to seek fulfillment outside of fiction, in engagement with the real world. Victorian Perspectives on Fiction, Feeling, and Ethics Taking up the second question--whether extratextual action must be the sole measure of fiction's efficacy--in a specifically Victorian context, it was not an uncommon belief in Trollope's time that reading fiction in itself represented a kind of ethical practice. …","PeriodicalId":288505,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20138195","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Scholars have paid substantial attention to questions of readerly sympathy with and compassion for fictional characters in conversations about affect in the Victorian novel. Both Victorian and contemporary critics of the novel have proposed that this type of identification with fiction is in itself a mode of ethical engagement with the real world, even if the precise dynamics of this relation remain unclear. Rachel Ablow's comments reflect that, although there is a widely held belief that fiction can have a potent effect in the extratextual world, the connection between world and text remains a rather tenuous one: "[t]he exact means by which novels were thought to instruct or influence readers varied widely. But the novel's ability to encourage sympathy was consistently identified as central to its effectiveness." (1) Mary-Catherine Harrison, attempting to clarify this relationship, traces a causal trajectory between novel-reading and ethical behavior in the real world this way: "readers engage in a metaphorical, or what we might call synechdocal, interpretation of character: taking the part (individual) to refer to the whole (group). In this way, readers' emotional responses to fictional individuals can be parlayed into an emotional and ethical response towards groups of people whom they represent." (2) Writing primarily on Charles Dickens, Harrison points out that "his vivid portraits of fictional suffering were coupled with epistemological claims of their accurate and faithful relationship to modern society"; in this way, Harrison suggests, Dickens' work moves to resolve the "non-interventionism inherent to the paradox of fiction: readers might not be able to intervene in characters' lives, but they can intervene on behalf of someone 'like' them." (3) Harrison's equation of feeling with action (4) implicitly relies not just on the idea that fictional characters are "like" or similar to real people in the world, but also on the notion that readers must like--that is, feel positively about--those fictional characters in order for them to desire to "intervene on behalf of their counterparts in the reader's own reference world. I find Harrison's arguments about realism's ethical aspirations and methodologies convincing. However, some key questions remain: just because readers could act in their own world based on feelings of sympathy for a fiction, does it necessarily follow that they do or did act upon those feelings? Is direct real-world action the only measure of ethical efficacy in fiction? And, most pertinently to the present analysis, what happens when readers do not like or identify with a work's fictional protagonists--do these feelings of aversion foreclose the possibility of positive ethical outcomes beyond the text? The first two questions have already informed the work of many critics, most notably Suzanne Keen's 2007 monograph Empathy and the Novel, and they will guide the present essay as context for my argument. However, whether fiction directly inspires ethical action in readers and whether this should be the ultimate arbiter of fiction's moral value are matters too complex and too significant to be resolved here--or perhaps in any single venue. I limit my own analysis, therefore, to probing the interpretive, affective, and ethical possibilities of a text that refuses to inspire the usual sympathy for its protagonists. Specifically, I consider Anthony Trollope's 1869 novel He Knew He Was Right as a case study in how particular formal, narrative elements--namely, targeted disnarration--may generate readerly revulsion. I argue that the negative emotional effect of this text might represent another mode of realizing the realist novel's ethical charge; more particularly, its pattern of disnarration could force the readers' thwarted desire for narrative resolution to seek fulfillment outside of fiction, in engagement with the real world. Victorian Perspectives on Fiction, Feeling, and Ethics Taking up the second question--whether extratextual action must be the sole measure of fiction's efficacy--in a specifically Victorian context, it was not an uncommon belief in Trollope's time that reading fiction in itself represented a kind of ethical practice. …
学者们对读者在维多利亚时代小说中关于情感的对话中对虚构人物的同情和同情给予了大量关注。维多利亚时代和当代的小说评论家都提出,这种对小说的认同本身就是一种与现实世界进行道德接触的模式,即使这种关系的确切动态尚不清楚。Rachel Ablow的评论反映出,尽管人们普遍认为小说可以在文本之外的世界产生强大的影响,但世界和文本之间的联系仍然相当薄弱:“小说被认为指导或影响读者的确切方式各不相同。但小说鼓励同情的能力一直被认为是其有效性的核心。”(1)玛丽-凯瑟琳·哈里森(Mary-Catherine Harrison)试图澄清这一关系,她以这种方式追溯了小说阅读与现实世界中的道德行为之间的因果轨迹:“读者对人物的解读是隐喻的,或者我们可以称之为协同的:用部分(个人)来指代整体(群体)。”通过这种方式,读者对虚构人物的情感反应可以转化为对他们所代表的群体的情感和道德反应。”(2)在主要论述查尔斯·狄更斯的文章中,哈里森指出,“他对虚构苦难的生动描绘,与他们与现代社会准确而忠实的关系的认识论主张相结合”;哈里森认为,通过这种方式,狄更斯的作品解决了“小说悖论中固有的不干涉主义:读者可能无法干预人物的生活,但他们可以代表“喜欢”他们的人进行干预。”(3)哈里森的感觉与行动的等式隐含地不仅依赖于虚构人物“像”或与世界上的真实人物相似的观点,而且还依赖于读者必须喜欢——也就是说,对这些虚构人物有积极的感觉——这样他们才会渴望“代表读者自己的参考世界中的对应人物进行干预”。我发现哈里森关于现实主义伦理抱负和方法论的论点令人信服。然而,一些关键的问题仍然存在:仅仅因为读者可以根据对小说的同情在自己的世界里行事,就一定意味着他们会根据这些感觉行事吗?现实世界的直接行动是小说中道德效能的唯一衡量标准吗?而且,与目前的分析最相关的是,当读者不喜欢或不认同一部作品中的虚构主人公时,会发生什么——这些厌恶的感觉是否排除了文本之外积极的道德结果的可能性?前两个问题已经影响了许多评论家的作品,最著名的是苏珊娜·基恩(Suzanne Keen) 2007年的专著《移情与小说》(Empathy and The Novel),它们将指导本文作为我的论点的背景。然而,小说是否直接激发了读者的道德行为,以及这是否应该成为小说道德价值的最终仲裁者,这是一个太复杂、太重要的问题,无法在这里解决——或者可能在任何一个地方解决。因此,我将自己的分析限制在探究文本的解释、情感和伦理可能性上,因为它拒绝激发人们对其主人公通常的同情。具体来说,我把安东尼·特罗洛普(Anthony Trollope) 1869年的小说《他知道自己是对的》作为一个案例,研究特定的正式叙事元素——即有针对性的不叙述——是如何引起读者反感的。笔者认为,这种文本的消极情感效应可能代表了现实主义小说伦理责任的另一种实现模式;更具体地说,它的非叙述模式可能会迫使读者在小说之外寻求满足,在与现实世界的接触中寻求叙事解决方案的受挫愿望。维多利亚时代对小说、情感和伦理的看法我们再来看第二个问题——是否文本外的行为必须是衡量小说效力的唯一标准——在维多利亚时代的特殊背景下,人们普遍认为阅读小说本身就代表了一种伦理实践。…