Disentangling Managers’ and Analysts’ Non-GAAP Reporting

Jeremiah W. Bentley, Theodore E. Christensen, Kurt H. Gee, Benjamin C. Whipple
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引用次数: 99

Abstract

Researchers frequently proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers’ non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore this important question by creating the first large‐sample data set of managers’ non‐GAAP earnings disclosures, which we directly compare to I/B/E/S data. Although we find a substantial overlap between the two data sets, we also find that they differ in systematic ways because I/B/E/S (1) excludes managers’ lower quality non‐GAAP numbers and (2) sometimes provides higher quality non‐GAAP measures that managers do not explicitly disclose. Our results indicate that using I/B/E/S to identify managers’ non‐GAAP disclosures significantly underestimates the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. We encourage researchers interested in managers’ non‐GAAP reporting to use our newly available data set of manager‐disclosed non‐GAAP metrics because it more accurately captures managers’ reporting choices.
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理清经理人和分析师的非公认会计准则报告
研究人员经常使用I/B/E/S等分析师预测数据提供商(fdp)提供的绩效指标来代替管理者的非公认会计准则披露。然而,FDP提供的收益在多大程度上是经理人非公认会计准则报告的有效代理,一直存在广泛的争议。我们通过创建经理人非公认会计准则收益披露的第一个大样本数据集来探索这个重要问题,我们直接将其与I/B/E/S数据进行比较。虽然我们发现两个数据集之间存在大量重叠,但我们也发现它们在系统方式上存在差异,因为I/B/E/S(1)排除了管理者较低质量的非GAAP数据,(2)有时提供了管理者未明确披露的更高质量的非GAAP指标。我们的研究结果表明,使用I/B/E/S来识别管理者的非公认会计准则披露,大大低估了他们报告选择的积极性。我们鼓励对经理的非公认会计准则报告感兴趣的研究人员使用我们最新提供的经理披露的非公认会计准则指标数据集,因为它更准确地捕捉了经理的报告选择。
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