Fear as a Motivation to Commit Management Fraud: A Conceptual Paper Regarding Ethics and Executive Accounting

Fran Lombardo
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Motivators for financial statement fraud are different than for traditional fraud that involved theft, management fraud and misappropriation of assets, respectively. Traditional theft of assets involves some element of greed and financial pressure is probably the most likely motivator for these frauds. Management fraud, the intentional misstatement of financial results in reports filed with regulatory agencies and made known to the public through various media, however is quite different in what is being attempted. Although there can be gain to the company, the fraud itself is not gaining financial position for management as much as it is preventing the loss of financial position. This is motivation for executives that revolve around potential damages to their ego when their failed vision for the company is known. This loss or reputation and status for the company executive creates a primary motivator that is the fear of failure. The executive also can entertain persistent, possibly delusional rationalizations for the hope for success in turning the situation around. This conceptual paper explores models for applying this idea to current fraud theory. It also posits that proper risk management evaluation can assist in reducing the incidence of management fraud not just by reducing the likelihood of losses occurring that can act as a catalyst for management fraud but by providing plans for addressing potential negative downturns when they occur that mitigates the strength of this fear.
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恐惧作为实施管理欺诈的动机:一篇关于道德与执行会计的概念论文
财务报表舞弊的动机与传统舞弊不同,传统舞弊分别涉及盗窃、管理舞弊和侵占资产。传统的资产盗窃涉及一些贪婪的因素,而经济压力可能是这些欺诈行为最可能的动机。然而,管理欺诈,即在向监管机构提交的报告中故意虚报财务结果,并通过各种媒体向公众公布,与所尝试的完全不同。虽然公司可以从中获利,但欺诈本身并没有为管理层赢得更多的财务地位,而是防止了财务地位的损失。这是高管们的动机,当他们对公司的愿景失败时,他们会担心自己的自尊心可能受到损害。这种名誉和地位的损失为公司高管创造了一个主要的动机,那就是害怕失败。高管们也会为了成功扭转局面的希望而不断地、可能是妄想性地找理由。这篇概念性论文探讨了将这一想法应用于当前欺诈理论的模型。它还假定,适当的风险管理评估可以帮助减少管理欺诈的发生率,不仅通过减少可能成为管理欺诈催化剂的损失发生的可能性,而且通过提供应对潜在负面经济衰退的计划,从而减轻这种恐惧的强度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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