Bootstrapping and maintaining trust in the cloud

N. Schear, Patrick T. Cable, Thomas Moyer, Bryan Richard, Robert Rudd
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引用次数: 28

Abstract

Today's infrastructure as a service (IaaS) cloud environments rely upon full trust in the provider to secure applications and data. Cloud providers do not offer the ability to create hardware-rooted cryptographic identities for IaaS cloud resources or sufficient information to verify the integrity of systems. Trusted computing protocols and hardware like the TPM have long promised a solution to this problem. However, these technologies have not seen broad adoption because of their complexity of implementation, low performance, and lack of compatibility with virtualized environments. In this paper we introduce keylime, a scalable trusted cloud key management system. keylime provides an end-to-end solution for both bootstrapping hardware rooted cryptographic identities for IaaS nodes and for system integrity monitoring of those nodes via periodic attestation. We support these functions in both bare-metal and virtualized IaaS environments using a virtual TPM. keylime provides a clean interface that allows higher level security services like disk encryption or configuration management to leverage trusted computing without being trusted computing aware. We show that our bootstrapping protocol can derive a key in less than two seconds, we can detect system integrity violations in as little as 110ms, and that keylime can scale to thousands of IaaS cloud nodes.
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引导和维护对云的信任
今天的基础设施即服务(IaaS)云环境依赖于对提供商的完全信任来保护应用程序和数据。云提供商不能为IaaS云资源创建基于硬件的加密身份,也不能提供足够的信息来验证系统的完整性。可信计算协议和硬件(如TPM)长期以来一直承诺解决这个问题。然而,由于实现的复杂性、低性能和缺乏与虚拟化环境的兼容性,这些技术尚未得到广泛采用。本文介绍了一个可扩展的可信云密钥管理系统keylime。keylime提供了一个端到端的解决方案,既可以为IaaS节点引导硬件根加密身份,也可以通过定期认证对这些节点进行系统完整性监控。我们使用虚拟TPM在裸机和虚拟化IaaS环境中支持这些功能。Keylime提供了一个简洁的接口,允许更高级别的安全服务(如磁盘加密或配置管理)在不感知可信计算的情况下利用可信计算。我们展示了我们的引导协议可以在不到两秒的时间内获得一个密钥,我们可以在短短110毫秒内检测到系统完整性违规,并且keylime可以扩展到数千个IaaS云节点。
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