Brentano and Scholasticism

G. Vdovina
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The article deals with the problem of scholastic sources of Brentano’s concept of intentionality. The subject matter of the discussion is the so-called thesis on intentionality as formulated by Brentano in his 1874 book “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”. The search for Brentano's specific scholastic sources has been going on for decades, but even today the problem is still relevant. The objectives of the article are, firstly, to identify the main positions on the issue and to reveal the reasons for their failure, and, secondly, to suggest our own hypothesis providing arguments in its favor. On the basis of the existing publications the following positions are briefly formulated: 1) hypothesis of borrowing from Thomas Aquinas; 2) hypothesis of borrowing from Aristotle; 3) hypothesis of borrowing from the 14th century scholastics. The inconsistency of these hypotheses, each on its own grounds, is shown. The first hypothesis proceeds from false assumptions, the second one is obviously reductionist, the third one correctly identifies the points of similarity between Brentano and the scholastics, but underestimates the differences between them. The author’s hypothesis is that the most precise parallel to Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality is found in the early modern scholasticism. It is supported from two sides. First, on the basis of Brentano’s biographical and reading history, arguments are formulated in favor of the validity of this assumption. It is shown that Brentano was able to reach the scholastics of Descartes’ epoch through his reading of the works of German neoscholastics of the mid-nineteenth century. Brentano’s and baroque scholasticism’s main points about intentionality are then formulated: 1) distinction between intentional and physical phenomena as a core of intentional philosophy; 2) intentionality as a property of all, not only intellectual, mental acts; 3) notion of intentional object and its variations; 4) objective being; 5) reality of mental acts and irreality of their contents. The comparison shows that they are similar in both traditions not only substantively, but also functionally.
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布伦塔诺和经院哲学
本文探讨了布伦塔诺意向性概念的学术来源问题。讨论的主题是所谓的意向性论文,由布伦塔诺在他1874年出版的《经验主义心理学》一书中阐述。寻找布伦塔诺的具体学术来源已经进行了几十年,但即使在今天,这个问题仍然具有相关性。这篇文章的目的是,首先,确定在这个问题上的主要立场,并揭示他们失败的原因,其次,提出我们自己的假设,提供有利于它的论据。在现有文献的基础上,简要阐述了以下观点:1)借用托马斯·阿奎那的假设;2)借用亚里士多德假说;3)借用14世纪经院哲学家的假设。这些假设,每一个都有自己的根据,是不一致的。第一个假设是基于错误的假设,第二个假设是明显的还原论,第三个假设正确地识别了布伦塔诺与经院哲学家之间的共同点,但低估了他们之间的差异。作者的假设是,与布伦塔诺的意向性学说最精确的平行是在近代早期的经院哲学中发现的。它由两侧支撑。首先,在布伦塔诺的传记和阅读史的基础上,提出了支持这一假设有效性的论点。研究表明,布伦塔诺通过阅读19世纪中期德国新经院哲学家的著作,能够触及到笛卡尔时代的经院哲学家。然后阐述了布伦塔诺和巴洛克经院哲学关于意向性的主要观点:1)意向性与物理现象的区别是意向性哲学的核心;2)意向性是所有行为的属性,而不仅仅是智力行为;意旨客体的概念及其变化;4)客观存在;5)心理行为的现实性及其内容的非现实性。比较表明,两种传统不仅在内容上,而且在功能上都有相似之处。
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