{"title":"Counterclaims Based on International Human Rights Obligations of Investors in International Investment Arbitration","authors":"P. Abel","doi":"10.1163/23527072-00101003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The 2016 ICSID award in Urbaser v. Argentina affirmed for the first time the possibility of a counterclaim in investment arbitration based on an international investor obligation under the human right to water. But to denounce a break-through and fundamental change in both international investment and human rights law would be premature. This article deconstructs the award’s reasoning and sheds light on its doctrinal fallacies, in particular the award’s unclear construction of the integration of a human rights obligation into investment arbitration and its misled argumentation on the existence of an international human rights obligation of private actors under the human right to water. Concluding that the award cannot be sustained under the current state of international law, the article then reflects on the potential of the award’s conception of human rights counterclaims for the future of international investment law and international human rights law.","PeriodicalId":313746,"journal":{"name":"Brill Open Law","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Brill Open Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/23527072-00101003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
The 2016 ICSID award in Urbaser v. Argentina affirmed for the first time the possibility of a counterclaim in investment arbitration based on an international investor obligation under the human right to water. But to denounce a break-through and fundamental change in both international investment and human rights law would be premature. This article deconstructs the award’s reasoning and sheds light on its doctrinal fallacies, in particular the award’s unclear construction of the integration of a human rights obligation into investment arbitration and its misled argumentation on the existence of an international human rights obligation of private actors under the human right to water. Concluding that the award cannot be sustained under the current state of international law, the article then reflects on the potential of the award’s conception of human rights counterclaims for the future of international investment law and international human rights law.