Settlement Achievement

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the first of two principal rationales supporting the use of peace referendums, namely settlement achievement. The chapter starts by locating the argument of the book in the public reason tradition, and specifically in the work of John Rawls. The chapter identifies how public values often feature in crucial, if generally under-appreciated, ways in peace agreements—not just as lofty aspirations but as powerful normative constraints on the content of particular constitutional clauses. The chapter then defends the claim that non-elites may be as, or even more, adept than some classes of elites (such as governmental, ethnic, or secessionist leaders) at deliberating about those values. We accept that constitutional settlements often contain a great deal of institutional detail; and we also accept that elites are usually better placed to deliberate about that detail. Yet we explain why the comparative advantage may rest with non-elites when it comes to deliberating about general public values. All of this is contingent on robust deliberative institutional supports being in place, both through the course of the referendum campaign and at the final vote.