Social Origins of Institutional Strength

T. Falleti
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Much has been written in the social sciences about why and how institutions come about and gradually change. Less attention, however, has been paid to the questions of why and how institutions strengthen. Prior consultation, when applied in the hydrocarbons sectors, is an institution that articulates the conflicting interests of states, extractive corporations, and indigenous communities. As such, it is a hard test for institutional strengthening. In this chapter, building upon the editors’ understanding of weak institutions, I propose a conceptualization of institutional strength based on social actors’ compliance (rooted in the legitimacy and efficacy of the institution) and on state’s enforcement. I trace these dimensions in the institutionalization of prior consultation in Bolivia since that country’s ratification of the International Labor Organization Convention 169 in 1991 until the present. I argue that prior consultation was adopted due to mobilization and political pressure from indigenous groups. However, the institution remained weak, a window dressing institution. Only when the indigenous movement was politically incorporated, they could activate the institution through their participation in the processes of regulation and implementation. Only then, prior consultation in hydrocarbons was systematically complied with and enforced. This chapter will show that the political incorporation of the mobilized groups who are behind institutional creation leads to institutional strengthening.
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制度力量的社会根源
摘要:在社会科学领域,关于制度产生的原因和方式以及逐渐变化的研究已经有很多。然而,对机构为何以及如何加强的问题关注较少。在碳氢化合物领域,事先协商是一种阐明国家、采掘公司和土著社区利益冲突的制度。因此,这是对加强体制的一次严峻考验。在本章中,基于编者对弱势制度的理解,我提出了一种基于社会行为者的服从(植根于制度的合法性和有效性)和国家执行的制度力量的概念。我在玻利维亚自1991年批准国际劳工组织第169号公约以来直至目前的事先协商制度化中追溯了这些方面。我认为,由于土著群体的动员和政治压力,采取了事先协商。然而,该机构仍然很弱,是一个粉饰门面的机构。只有当土著运动在政治上被纳入时,他们才能通过参与管理和执行过程来激活该机构。只有这样,在碳氢化合物方面的事先协商才得以系统地遵守和执行。本章将表明,支持制度创造的动员群体的政治结合导致制度加强。
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Index Coercion Gaps Conclusion Social Origins of Institutional Strength The Stickiness of “Bad” Institutions
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