Do Analysts Cater to Investor Information Demand?

M. Hossain, Benjamin A. Jansen, Jon Taylor
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We extend the literature by investigating whether analysts cater their coverage to investor information demand. Results suggest that analysts’ coverage is contemporaneously positively associated with investor information demand, and negatively associated with the previous time periods information demand. However, the magnitude of the contemporaneous positive association is greater than the magnitude of the proceeding negative association. This implies analyst following significantly increases on firms which have more retail and institutional information demand, but partially revert their coverage after the information demand shock. Furthermore, results suggest that analysts cater their coverage more towards institutional investors, relative to retail investors. These results suggest that analysts focus their coverage on companies that have garnered the most interest from investors, thus potentially maximizing the utility of the information the analyst disseminates.
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分析师是否迎合了投资者的信息需求?
我们通过调查分析师是否迎合投资者信息需求来扩展文献。结果表明,分析师的覆盖率与投资者信息需求同时呈正相关,与前期信息需求呈负相关。然而,同时的积极关联的幅度大于之前的消极关联的幅度。这意味着分析师对具有更多零售和机构信息需求的公司的关注显著增加,但在信息需求冲击后部分恢复其覆盖。此外,结果表明,相对于散户投资者,分析师更倾向于迎合机构投资者。这些结果表明,分析师将他们的报道重点放在那些获得投资者最感兴趣的公司上,从而有可能最大化分析师传播的信息的效用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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