Gedachtes Wohnen: Heidegger and cultural geography

Abstract

Few figures arouse the kind of passions both for and against as those that are associated with Martin Heidegger do. Perhaps the most important philosopher of the twentieth century (with apologies to Wittgenstein), Heidegger will always be associated with National Socialism. Heidegger the man will forever challenge Heidegger the philosopher, even though the former has led the defense of the latter by trying to distance himself from National Socialism. His critics have not let this claim go unchallenged: Victor Farı́as’ Heidegger and Nazism leads the charge against the philosopher’s revisionist history. Farı́as’ controversial work launched a fierce debate in France among French Heideggerians. Certainly, the link between Heidegger’s thought and his adherence to National Socialism cannot be disputed. Recently, Heidegger’s post-war works, especially those dealing with the impact of technology, have received closer attention. Samuel Weber’s Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media, Miguel de Beistegui’s Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias, and Michael Zimmerman’s Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity are just three works that explore themes prominent in Heidegger’s later works. Ironically, there has been a revival of interest on the left from environmentalists who are interested in Heidegger’s view of the relation between man and technology and the earth. This article will examine two of Heidegger’s essays that have received comparatively little attention and that have implications for environmental thought and reveal, in my view, intellectual affinities to National Socialist thought that Heidegger either did not realize or simply chose to ignore. In two essays written during the 1950s, “Das Ding” (The Thing), and “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (Building Dwelling Thinking), Heidegger develops his ideas of space and the human relationship to space. Most peculiar is his view, expressed in “The Thing,” that the empty space inside a jug is what actually defined the jug as a jug, not the sides, bottom, or handles of the said container. Heidegger makes a distinction between two kinds of space. The first is space as extension, which can be best represented as a mathematical conception of space (e.g., geometry). The second view is somewhat trickier to nail down. It does not consider space as an abstract entity but as