Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285462
P. Anker
The first defense of animal rights came in the form of a joke on human rights. As a reaction against the new ethics of the Enlightenment, a conservative aristocrat ridiculed rights for men and women by arguing that these would eventually lead to the laughable and absurd idea of giving rights to brutes, and perhaps even plants and things. The idea of human rights should thus be abandoned. After two hundred years it is worth revisiting this old argument to address the question of whether granting moral status to animals, plants, and even landscapes eventually makes hard-won human rights into a joke. In 1790, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–97) published Vindication of the Rights of Men in response to Edmund Burke’s conservative view of the French revolution. She argued that every man has an equal right to education because of his equal intrinsic capability to reason. Soon Thomas Paine (1737–1809) followed suit with a similar line of argument in his Rights of Man (1791). A year later Wollstonecraft enlarged her argument to also include women in her Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). These celebrated books stand today as examples of Enlightenment philosophies that also embody key values of today’s world. In their own time, they created much debate and were ill received by the conservative establishment. One particularly critical response, which will be the focus of the following pages, came in the pamphlet Vindication of the Rights of Brutes, published anonymously in 1792. This little booklet, largely ignored by historians of animal rights, suggested that animals were entitled to rights because of their intrinsic capabilities to reason, speak, and have emotions. Animals were entitled to rights because of these inherent characteristics and not because of human obligations or sympathies towards them. The booklet thus represents one of the first biocentric arguments in favor of animal rights. These arguments countered those of the Enlightenment thinkers concerned about the moral status of animals, plants, and things. The most important one was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who argued that even though only humans had rights, they ought not to treat animals badly, or destroy plants and other beautiful things. Such acts of the spiritus destructionis could corrupt the human sense of morality:
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Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285444
M. T. Allen
Troy Paddock’s paper recapitulates the well-known association of Martin Heidegger with National Socialism and further argues that this association extended to the Nazis’ racial imperialism. Surprisingly, Paddock does not include what is perhaps most pertinent to his point: namely, Heidegger’s inclusion in his 1953 publication of the Introduction to Metaphysics, and again in a Der Spiegel interview in the 1960s, of allusions to “the inner truth and greatness of this movement,” that is, National Socialism. The former would have come at the very time that Heidegger was writing the semi-mystical cultural anti-capitalist romanticism that is the core of the author’s discussion. The Introduction to Metaphysics appeared in German in 1953, though Heidegger had compiled most of it by 1935. “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken,” the essay which is central to the author’s argument, was delivered as a lecture in Darmstädt in 1952. Heidegger was, then, a more or less unrepentant “old Nazi” at the time he composed “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken.” The temptation to oversimplify the case is great, all the more so since Heidegger has achieved the status of guru among some who can brook no criticism of his holy name. However, it does no harm to point out, in Heidegger’s defense, that he also showed genuine anguish in his confrontation with National Socialism. There just never seems to have been enough to call true repentance, and there was certainly no repudiation. Any attempt, such as Paddock’s, to clarify the connections between Martin Heidegger and other thinkers in the ambit of the National Socialist intelligentsia should therefore be welcomed. Tying Heidegger to Nazi geographers like Friedrich Ratzel, the subject of this essay, would be a highly original contribution to intellectual history. On the other hand, to my lights, very little connects Heidegger to Ratzel’s geography other than a homology of thought or what is more or less a shared “notion.” Paddock might have added a bit of background on the community of geographers within which Ratzel worked. For example, Götz Aly and Suzanne Heim’s Vordenker der Vernichtung contains much information on influential German geographers like Walter Christaller, who influenced post-war geography as well as Nazi racial imperialism. Providing more than an apposition of Ratzel’s or any Nazi era geographers’ thought and
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Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285408
J. Räikkä
In this paper I will discuss the causes of global inequality. I will argue that there may be other important reasons for poverty than Western selfishness. Further, I will claim that most Western people believe that for one reason or another it is practically impossible to eradicate poverty, and that this shared belief itself may be a cause for why it is practically impossible to eradicate it in the near future. The question is about an unfortunate self-fulfilling prophecy. In my view, it is important to consider the background and logic of this prophecy.
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Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285417
R. Kirkman
Although debates about the shape and future of the built environment are usually cast in economic and political terms, they also have an irreducible ethical component that stands in need of careful examination. This paper is the report of an exploratory study in descriptive ethics carried out in Atlanta, Georgia. Archival sources and semi-structured interviews provide the basis for identifying and sorting the diverse value judgments and value conflicts that come into play in a rapidly growing metropolitan area. The goal of the project is to expand and refine a draft framework for grappling with the ethical complexity of the situations from which individuals and communities make important decisions about their surroundings. The success of the framework is to be measured by its usefulness in informing the judgment of professionals and citizens, and in facilitating a robust normative debate about the built environment.
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Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285435
T. Paddock
Few figures arouse the kind of passions both for and against as those that are associated with Martin Heidegger do. Perhaps the most important philosopher of the twentieth century (with apologies to Wittgenstein), Heidegger will always be associated with National Socialism. Heidegger the man will forever challenge Heidegger the philosopher, even though the former has led the defense of the latter by trying to distance himself from National Socialism. His critics have not let this claim go unchallenged: Victor Farı́as’ Heidegger and Nazism leads the charge against the philosopher’s revisionist history. Farı́as’ controversial work launched a fierce debate in France among French Heideggerians. Certainly, the link between Heidegger’s thought and his adherence to National Socialism cannot be disputed. Recently, Heidegger’s post-war works, especially those dealing with the impact of technology, have received closer attention. Samuel Weber’s Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media, Miguel de Beistegui’s Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias, and Michael Zimmerman’s Heidegger’s Confrontation with Modernity are just three works that explore themes prominent in Heidegger’s later works. Ironically, there has been a revival of interest on the left from environmentalists who are interested in Heidegger’s view of the relation between man and technology and the earth. This article will examine two of Heidegger’s essays that have received comparatively little attention and that have implications for environmental thought and reveal, in my view, intellectual affinities to National Socialist thought that Heidegger either did not realize or simply chose to ignore. In two essays written during the 1950s, “Das Ding” (The Thing), and “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (Building Dwelling Thinking), Heidegger develops his ideas of space and the human relationship to space. Most peculiar is his view, expressed in “The Thing,” that the empty space inside a jug is what actually defined the jug as a jug, not the sides, bottom, or handles of the said container. Heidegger makes a distinction between two kinds of space. The first is space as extension, which can be best represented as a mathematical conception of space (e.g., geometry). The second view is somewhat trickier to nail down. It does not consider space as an abstract entity but as
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Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285453
Troy R. E. Paddock
I would like to thank editors of Philosophy and Geography for the opportunity to respond to Professor Allen’s remarks and to clarify a few points. Ironically, some confusion stems from the concept of Raum, exactly what I hoped to illuminate. The subsequent paragraphs will attempt to briefly highlight the misunderstanding and suggest the importance of discussing what Professor Allen dismisses as a “homology of thought.” My article demonstrates that Heidegger understands Raum in terms of geography, not geometry. Space is lived in by people who have an effect on it and who are affected by it. Accompanying this view is an organic conception of the State based upon the interaction between a people and their land. This position is most closely associated with conservative romantics and what is referred to as volkisch thought in Imperial Germany, but it had adherents across the political spectrum. The most influential exposition of this view was Ratzel’s. For better or worse, Ratzel is acknowledged as the modern founder of German political geography and geopolitical thought. The basic geography books employed in German schools were heavily influenced by Ratzel’s thought, and many acknowledge him explicitly. In a 1901 publication, he offered an explanation of Lebensraum, and although the term is now associated exclusively with Nazi Ostforschung and its attempts to remake Eastern Europe along racial lines, the concept itself is not inherently fascist. The basic Darwinian premise behind the struggle for space also lends itself as a justification of European imperialism and racism even though Ratzel himself explicitly rejected racist arguments. The notion becomes racist or fascistic when peoples and cultures are ranked in a hierarchical fashion. I do not claim that Heidegger embraced the Nazi version of Lebensraum, nor would Ratzel have approved of it. This is why discussing a homology may be more interesting than Allen deems it. A common notion can be combined with other notions for interesting or undesirable results. Grounding the idea of space in geography rather than geometry and linking it to an organic conception of the nation-state is a recognizable concept to anyone familiar with Wilhelmine German thought. What makes it interesting is that it was not just the purview of the Right. Ratzel, who died in 1904, was not a Nazi geographer, and one cannot simply dismiss his work as “fascist” or even proto-fascist and leave it at that, unless one is willing to argue that the entire body of work justifying nineteenth-century
{"title":"In defense of homology and history: A response to Allen","authors":"Troy R. E. Paddock","doi":"10.1080/1090377042000285453","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1090377042000285453","url":null,"abstract":"I would like to thank editors of Philosophy and Geography for the opportunity to respond to Professor Allen’s remarks and to clarify a few points. Ironically, some confusion stems from the concept of Raum, exactly what I hoped to illuminate. The subsequent paragraphs will attempt to briefly highlight the misunderstanding and suggest the importance of discussing what Professor Allen dismisses as a “homology of thought.” My article demonstrates that Heidegger understands Raum in terms of geography, not geometry. Space is lived in by people who have an effect on it and who are affected by it. Accompanying this view is an organic conception of the State based upon the interaction between a people and their land. This position is most closely associated with conservative romantics and what is referred to as volkisch thought in Imperial Germany, but it had adherents across the political spectrum. The most influential exposition of this view was Ratzel’s. For better or worse, Ratzel is acknowledged as the modern founder of German political geography and geopolitical thought. The basic geography books employed in German schools were heavily influenced by Ratzel’s thought, and many acknowledge him explicitly. In a 1901 publication, he offered an explanation of Lebensraum, and although the term is now associated exclusively with Nazi Ostforschung and its attempts to remake Eastern Europe along racial lines, the concept itself is not inherently fascist. The basic Darwinian premise behind the struggle for space also lends itself as a justification of European imperialism and racism even though Ratzel himself explicitly rejected racist arguments. The notion becomes racist or fascistic when peoples and cultures are ranked in a hierarchical fashion. I do not claim that Heidegger embraced the Nazi version of Lebensraum, nor would Ratzel have approved of it. This is why discussing a homology may be more interesting than Allen deems it. A common notion can be combined with other notions for interesting or undesirable results. Grounding the idea of space in geography rather than geometry and linking it to an organic conception of the nation-state is a recognizable concept to anyone familiar with Wilhelmine German thought. What makes it interesting is that it was not just the purview of the Right. Ratzel, who died in 1904, was not a Nazi geographer, and one cannot simply dismiss his work as “fascist” or even proto-fascist and leave it at that, unless one is willing to argue that the entire body of work justifying nineteenth-century","PeriodicalId":431617,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Geography","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128912755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2004-08-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000285390
Jordana Dym
Early Modern European travelers sought to gather and disseminate knowledge through narratives written for avid publishers and public. Yet not all travelers used the same tools to inform their readers. Despite a shared interest in conveying new knowledge based on eyewitness authority, Grand Tour accounts differed in an important respect from travelogues about Asia: they were less likely to include maps until the late eighteenth century. This paper examines why, using travel accounts published between 1600 and 1800 about Italy and France (Europe) and India and Japan (Asia). It argues that maps of different types--coastlines, city plans, country topographies--appeared more frequently in accounts of Asian trips in part because of Europeans' more limited geographical knowledge about Asian destinations. More important, however, was the purpose of travel, the type of information gathered, and the intended audience of accounts. Seventeenth-century authors of Grand Tour experiences focused on single topics, ignored what seemed to be the familiar countryside they passed through, and showed little interest in geography. Their counterparts visiting Asia took an opposite tack, covering a wide range of subjects, including space, and cartographic representation was an important element within the account. Only in the eighteenth century, when the strange locale had become familiar and the familiar European destination became strange with new types of travel through it, were maps an important part of narrative.
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Pub Date : 2004-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000195994
S. Sullivan
While Sigmund Freud and Maurice Merleau‐Ponty both acknowledge the role that spatiality plays in human life, neither pays any explicit attention to the intersections of race and space. It is Franz Fanon who uses psychoanalysis and phenomenology to provide an account of how the psychical and lived bodily existence of black people is racially constituted by a racist world. More precisely, as I argue in this paper, Fanon's work demonstrates how psychical and bodily spatiality cannot be adequately understood apart from the environing space of the social world. For Fanon, body, psyche, and world mutually influence and constitute each other. In a raced and racist world, therefore, the lived bodily experience and the unconscious of human beings will be racially and racist‐ly constituted as well. This will show you how in psychoanalysis we take spatial ways of looking at things seriously. Sigmund Freud1 Everything throws us back on to the organic relations between subject and space, to that gearing of the subject onto his world which is the origin of space. Maurice Merleau‐Ponty2 Hence we are driven from the individual back to the social structure. If there is a [neurotic] taint, it lies not in the “soul” of the individual but rather in that of the environment. Franz Fanon3
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Pub Date : 2004-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000196001
Mariana Ortega
Existential space is lived space, space permeated by our raced, gendered selves. It is representative of our very existence. The purpose of this essay is to explore the intersection between this lived space and art by analyzing the work of the Cuban‐born artist Ana Mendieta and showing how her Siluetas Series discloses a space of exile. The first section discusses existential spatiality as explained by the phenomenologists Heidegger and Watsuji and as represented in Mendieta's Siluetas. The second section analyzes the space of exile as a space of in‐between‐ness and borders. Lastly, the third section discusses temporality as it relates to the space of exile. Through the analysis of Mendieta's Siluetas, and in light of phenomenological accounts of space and the works of Anzaldúa and Mignolo, Ana Mendieta herself is disclosed as well as the space characteristic of those who can no longer be said to have a “home.” My exploration through my art of the relationship between myself and nature has been a clear result of my having been torn from my homeland during my adolescence. The making of my Silueta in nature keeps (makes) the transition between my homeland and my new home. It is a way of reclaiming my roots and becoming one with nature. Although the culture in which I live is part of me, my roots and cultural identity are a result of my Cuban heritage.1 Ana Mendieta Living in a state of psychic unrest, in a Borderland, is what makes poets write and artists create.2 Gloria Anzaldúa
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Pub Date : 2004-02-01DOI: 10.1080/1090377042000195985
R. Sundstrom
Over drinks at a philosophy of science conference in Birmingham, Alabama, a philosopher of science who has contributed important work in the philosophy of biology and the metaphysics of human kinds asked me what considerations of social space add to philosophy of human categories. But, all things considered, what a question to ask in Birmingham! What do considerations of space add to our understanding of human categories? His question was motivated by simple and innocent curiosity, for the majority of the work in that area had simply been concerned with group intentionality, conditions for social facts, and the possibility of social reality between the subtle shades of various conceptions of nominalism. Just a few miles away from our lunch table were Kelly Ingram Park, the sixteenth street Baptist church, and the jail-cell in which Martin Luther King, on scraps of paper, penned “Letter from Birmingham City Jail.” Really, the question should be: How can we understand human categories, or even human experience, without the inclusion of social space and geography? In Birmingham, how can one talk so casually about “human kinds,” even if it is a most technical and removed notion, and not think of race and the experience of segregation? It is already incredible that we dare not remember that we are on land ethnically cleansed of its indigenous peoples. In Birmingham, in Alabama, in the US, on our planet since 1492 (at least), how can we understand race—in its earliest forms or as scientific racism—without considering place? It is no wonder that the American public pays its philosophers no heed. What could we possibly say that is worth anything if we cannot understand Birmingham amidst our philosophy? This special section of Philosophy and Geography collects six papers that in various ways bring together philosophy, race, and place. Together, these papers theorize the
在阿拉巴马州伯明翰举行的一次科学哲学会议上，一位在生物哲学和人类形而上学方面做出重要贡献的科学哲学家在喝酒时问我，对社会空间的考虑给人类范畴的哲学增加了什么。但是，考虑到所有的事情，在伯明翰问这个问题是多么困难啊!对空间的考虑增加了我们对人类类别的理解吗?他提出这个问题的动机是简单而天真的好奇心，因为在这个领域的大部分工作都只是关注群体意向性、社会事实的条件，以及在各种唯名论概念的微妙阴影之间的社会现实的可能性。离我们的午餐桌只有几英里远的地方是凯利·英格拉姆公园(Kelly Ingram Park)、第十六街的浸信会教堂(Baptist church)和马丁·路德·金(Martin Luther King)曾在那间牢房里用碎纸写过《伯明翰市监狱来信》(Letter from Birmingham City Jail)。实际上，问题应该是:如果不包括社会空间和地理，我们如何理解人类的类别，甚至人类的经验?在伯明翰，人们怎么能如此随意地谈论“人类”，即使这是一个最专业、最古老的概念，而不考虑种族和种族隔离的经历呢?令人难以置信的是，我们不敢记得我们生活在被土著人民种族清洗的土地上。在伯明翰，在阿拉巴马州，在美国，在我们的星球上，自1492年(至少)以来，我们如何理解种族——在其最早的形式或作为科学的种族主义——而不考虑位置?难怪美国公众对哲学家们不屑一顾。如果我们不能在我们的哲学中理解伯明翰，我们还能说什么有价值呢?《哲学与地理》的这个特别部分收集了六篇论文，这些论文以不同的方式将哲学、种族和地方联系在一起。总之，这些论文理论化了
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