Decentralized Financial Market Infrastructures

T. Swanson
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) have evolved as core elements of highly intermediated financial markets partly due to the technological limitations of the time when they were first architected. Organizations and firms were unable to share records without having to entrust a single party to manage them; hence this phenomenon of intermediation has led to significant information silos. Simultaneously, it has driven the structure of business models, as well as regulatory supervision and oversight, in ways that furthered intermediation and also created a misalignment of incentives and risk taking between entities now categorized as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and systemically important financial market infrastructures. Over time, this consolidation has led to highly concentrated FMIs and with it, concentrated risks. Some of these risks go beyond the credit risks of just one or two institutions, becoming instead systemic risks that are continuously monitored by regulatory bodies based on coordinated sets of principles and guidelines including the 2012 Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures from CPMI and IOSCO.

Over the past decade, advances in public key cryptography, hash functions, virtualisation, distributed consensus, multiparty computation, and peer-to-peer networking have led to experimentation around record sharing between erstwhile competitive firms. Over the past five years, a series of independent efforts has chaperoned regulatory requirements into a digital, automated state that enables secure information sharing in full compliance with the law, while simultaneously enabling market participants to mutualise infrastructure that would otherwise be run by a single trusted party. With these developments, many of the services that centralised intermediaries currently provide could potentially be replaced by decentralised infrastructures or decentralised financial market infrastructure (dFMI). dFMI also enables a change in business structure, where a re-alignment of incentives can take place such that those firms taking risks can fully bear the consequences of these risks.
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分散的金融市场基础设施
金融市场基础设施(fmi)已经发展成为高度中介化的金融市场的核心要素,部分原因是由于它们最初被构建时的技术限制。组织和公司如果不委托某一方管理,就无法共享记录;因此,这种中介现象导致了严重的信息孤岛。与此同时,它推动了商业模式的结构,以及监管和监督,以促进中介的方式,也造成了现在被归类为系统重要性金融机构(sifi)和系统重要性金融市场基础设施的实体之间的激励和风险承担的错位。随着时间的推移,这种整合导致了金融金融机构的高度集中,随之而来的是风险的集中。其中一些风险超出了一两家机构的信用风险,而是成为由监管机构根据一系列协调一致的原则和指导方针(包括CPMI和IOSCO的2012年金融市场基础设施原则)持续监测的系统性风险。在过去的十年中,公钥密码学、哈希函数、虚拟化、分布式共识、多方计算和点对点网络的进步导致了过去竞争公司之间记录共享的实验。在过去的5年里,一系列独立的努力伴随着监管要求进入了一个数字化、自动化的状态,使安全的信息共享完全符合法律,同时使市场参与者能够共同使用基础设施,否则这些基础设施将由一个受信任的一方运营。随着这些发展,中心化中介机构目前提供的许多服务可能会被去中心化基础设施或去中心化金融市场基础设施(dFMI)所取代。dFMI还可以改变业务结构,重新调整激励措施,使那些承担风险的公司能够完全承担这些风险的后果。
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