Law in the Time of Constitutional Rot

J. Balkin
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Abstract

In periods of advanced constitutional rot, judicial decisions become especially polarized. Judicial majorities tend to reach decisions that increase economic inequality, shrink the electorate, and help maintain political oligarchy. Members of the dominant party want judges to help them stay in power, to support politicians’ self-entrenching behavior, to defend and protect politicians from charges of corruption, and to enrich their financial supporters. As a result, the judiciary tends to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Ordinarily, the US Constitution relies on the judiciary to protect democracy and republican government, and to prevent political corruption and self-entrenching behavior. But in periods of advanced constitutional rot, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary are likely to be ineffective and may even make matters worse.
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宪法腐朽时代的法律
在宪法严重腐朽的时期,司法裁决变得特别两极化。司法多数倾向于做出增加经济不平等、缩小选民规模和帮助维持政治寡头统治的决定。执政党的成员希望法官帮助他们继续掌权,支持政客的自我巩固行为,捍卫和保护政客免受腐败指控,并为他们的财政支持者提供丰富的资金。因此,司法机构往往成为问题的一部分,而不是解决方案的一部分。通常情况下,美国宪法依靠司法来保护民主和共和政府,防止政治腐败和自我巩固的行为。但是,在宪法严重腐败的时期,最高法院和联邦司法机构很可能是无效的,甚至可能使事情变得更糟。
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