Conference Report: The Third International Conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science (GWP.2019), 25-27 February, 2019

Abstract

During an unseasonably warm and sunny three days in February, the University of Cologne welcomed some 150 attendees for the third international conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP.2019). The conference covered a variety of philosophical themes, from epistemology and ethics to metaphysics and methodology, and encompassed studies from the whole gamut of natural and social sciences. The GWP has become a well-established scientific society since its foundation in 2012, as witnessed by its ever growing numbers and profile. As well as six plenary lectures, this third conference of the GWP featured nearly 130 talks in six parallel sessions. In accordance with the mission statement of the GWP, young researchers were encouraged to present and the conference programme was extended to accommodate talks by PhD students. The gender balance was less satisfactory; despite a positive policy of favoring submissions by women, they counted for only 35 of 130 speakers, or 27%. Together, the talks covered most of the key topics in contemporary philosophy of science; especially prominent were—in no particular order—modelling, explanation, understanding, interdisciplinarity, realism, values, reductionism, and of course discussions of theories, laws, concepts and evidence. While many talks were on biology and physics, the conference also covered a wide range of sciences including psychology, economics, biomedicine, mathematics, cognitive science, and climate science. The diversity of topics was reflected in the plenary lectures, which covered history, metaphysics, epistemology, policy making, and science communication. The conference began with the first keynote speaker, Kärin Nickelsen (LMU Munich), addressing the often fraught relationship between history and philosophy of science. While it is clear to many that philosophers must be sensitive to the history of the sciences, it is less clear how they can do so without cherry-picking or making unjustified generalizations. Using historical research on the fragmented and convoluted