Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability

Kyle D. Logue, J. Slemrod
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

The Coase Theorem and the vast literature it inspired explore two basic questions: to whom should responsibility for external harms be assigned and how will that assignment matter. Building on the Coasean insight in the torts context, Guido Calabresi observed that the assignment of tort liability can indeed matter from an efficiency perspective and should, under certain assumptions, be assigned to the "cheapest cost avoider." This article applies a similar Coasean/Calabresian framework to a related (though not identical) set of questions in the tax context: To whom should the responsibility for remitting taxes be assigned and when and how will that assignment matter? Following Calabresi's canonical formulation for the design of an optimal tort system, we conclude that an optimal tax remittance regime requires that tax liabilities be assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and administration for a given level of achievement of the tax law's desired distributional and revenue goals. This will sometimes mean assigning tax remittance responsibility to the lowest-compliance-cost remitter, and other times not - if that party happens also to be the lowest-cost liability avoider (the party best able to evade the tax). This comparison of tax remittance responsibility and tort remittance responsibility produces a number of positive and normative insights. For example, it helps to explain why the remittance responsibility for the retail sales tax lies primarily with the sellers rather than the buyers, as well as why we have wage withholding for the income tax. And it helps to explain some existing types of non-wage withholding, such as withholding on payments to foreign taxpayers. This framework also supports a number of reforms in the current U.S. regime for tax enforcement such as expanding the withholding requirement to payments made to independent contractors, which are a type of payment that currently contributes significantly to the overall U.S. federal tax gap.
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科斯,卡拉布雷西和最优纳税义务
科斯定理及其启发的大量文献探讨了两个基本问题:谁应该为外部损害承担责任,以及这种分配有何意义。基于科斯恩对侵权行为的见解,Guido Calabresi观察到,从效率的角度来看,侵权责任的分配确实很重要,并且在某些假设下,应该分配给“最便宜的成本规避者”。本文将类似的Coasean/Calabresian框架应用于税收环境中的一系列相关(尽管不完全相同)问题:汇出税的责任应该分配给谁?何时以及如何分配?根据卡拉布雷西关于最优侵权制度设计的规范公式,我们得出结论,最优的税收汇款制度要求纳税义务的分配,以便在达到税法预期的分配和收入目标的给定水平时,使合规和管理的总体社会成本最小化。这有时意味着将纳税责任分配给合规成本最低的汇款人,而有时则不是——如果该方恰好也是成本最低的责任逃避者(最能逃税的一方)。这种对纳税汇款责任和侵权汇款责任的比较产生了一些积极和规范的见解。例如,它有助于解释为什么零售销售税的汇款责任主要在于卖家而不是买家,以及为什么我们有所得税的工资预扣。它还有助于解释一些现有的非工资扣缴类型,例如对外国纳税人付款的扣缴。该框架还支持当前美国税收执法制度的一些改革,例如将预扣税要求扩大到支付给独立承包商的款项,这是一种目前对美国整体联邦税收缺口有重大贡献的付款类型。
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