Hometown Tax Donation is designed to bolster regional economies through the provision of reciprocal gifts by local businesses, and can be regarded as a unique SME policy which is not reliant on subsidies, but instead, offers businesses the incentive to develop attractive products and yields better results when businesses and municipalities collaborate closely. To assess its effectiveness, we surveyed certain gift providers on their efforts in new product development and advancement in business capabilities. Results showed that the gift market is sowing the seeds for development of new products and businesses in rural areas, and is also boosting business capabilities in many cases. Meanwhile, certain companies have earned large revenues from gifts or are overdependent on gifts. It is therefore necessary to make Hometown Tax Donation function as a viable SME policy which incorporates an exit strategy.
{"title":"Emergence of Regional Entrepreneurship Through Hometown Tax Donation - Unique Regional Development System: Implications from Development of New Products and Improvement in Business Capabilities by Gift Providers -","authors":"Takaaki Hoda, Yuichiro Kubo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3240432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3240432","url":null,"abstract":"Hometown Tax Donation is designed to bolster regional economies through the provision of reciprocal gifts by local businesses, and can be regarded as a unique SME policy which is not reliant on subsidies, but instead, offers businesses the incentive to develop attractive products and yields better results when businesses and municipalities collaborate closely. To assess its effectiveness, we surveyed certain gift providers on their efforts in new product development and advancement in business capabilities. \u0000Results showed that the gift market is sowing the seeds for development of new products and businesses in rural areas, and is also boosting business capabilities in many cases. Meanwhile, certain companies have earned large revenues from gifts or are overdependent on gifts. It is therefore necessary to make Hometown Tax Donation function as a viable SME policy which incorporates an exit strategy.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123228040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Politicians invest millions of public money in programs with the goal of creating new jobs in order to increase the overall wealth in their countries. While most State and Federal programs focus on small business without differentiating between high-potential startups and small businesses likely to remain small, the New Jersey Technology Business Tax Certificate Transfer Program (NOL) focuses on high-potential technology and biotechnology companies. Whilst there is recognition in business and research literature about the importance of early-stage companies in boosting economic growth and the necessity of government programs aimed at supporting them, in the literature there is little or no documentation of market failures occurring due to informational asymmetries. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of the NOL program in creating high wage, high quality jobs in the state of New Jersey. Analyzing the level of wages and the number of jobs created by the beneficiary companies over a five-year interval, we focus on the difference in growth performance between biotechnology and other technology industries. Employing data provided by the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA), we created a brand new panel database of beneficiary companies. Controlling per industry and per year, we find that the beneficiary biotechnology companies outperform the beneficiary other technology companies, pointing to an adverse selection bias due to asymmetric information in the pool of applicants.
{"title":"Adverse Selection in Tax Credit Programs for Biotechnology and Other Technology Startups","authors":"Michael Ehrlich, C. Ziveri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3152604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3152604","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians invest millions of public money in programs with the goal of creating new jobs in order to increase the overall wealth in their countries. While most State and Federal programs focus on small business without differentiating between high-potential startups and small businesses likely to remain small, the New Jersey Technology Business Tax Certificate Transfer Program (NOL) focuses on high-potential technology and biotechnology companies. Whilst there is recognition in business and research literature about the importance of early-stage companies in boosting economic growth and the necessity of government programs aimed at supporting them, in the literature there is little or no documentation of market failures occurring due to informational asymmetries. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of the NOL program in creating high wage, high quality jobs in the state of New Jersey. Analyzing the level of wages and the number of jobs created by the beneficiary companies over a five-year interval, we focus on the difference in growth performance between biotechnology and other technology industries. Employing data provided by the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (NJEDA), we created a brand new panel database of beneficiary companies. Controlling per industry and per year, we find that the beneficiary biotechnology companies outperform the beneficiary other technology companies, pointing to an adverse selection bias due to asymmetric information in the pool of applicants.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129191862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyze the optimal taxation of profits and labor income under endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in their skill and cost of setting up a firm, and can become workers or entrepreneurs. A tax system in which profits and labor income are subject to the same schedule uses general equilibrium effects through wages to indirectly redistribute across occupations. Optimal policies can involve low tax rates at the top and distortions of firms' input choices. However, these properties disappear under a differential treatment of profits and labor income. Then, redistribution is achieved directly through taxes and production efficiency is always optimal.
{"title":"Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry","authors":"Florian Scheuer","doi":"10.1257/POL.6.2.126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/POL.6.2.126","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze the optimal taxation of profits and labor income under endogenous firm formation. Individuals differ in their skill and cost of setting up a firm, and can become workers or entrepreneurs. A tax system in which profits and labor income are subject to the same schedule uses general equilibrium effects through wages to indirectly redistribute across occupations. Optimal policies can involve low tax rates at the top and distortions of firms' input choices. However, these properties disappear under a differential treatment of profits and labor income. Then, redistribution is achieved directly through taxes and production efficiency is always optimal.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121526794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fabian Meißner, Georg Schneider, Caren Sureth-Sloane
In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principal's incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.
{"title":"The Impact of Corporate Taxes and Flexibility on Entrepreneurial Decisions with Moral Hazard and Simultaneous Firm and Personal Level Taxation","authors":"Fabian Meißner, Georg Schneider, Caren Sureth-Sloane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2219190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2219190","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principal's incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130061190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Debacker, B. Heim, Vasia Panousi, Shanthi P. Ramnath, Ivan Vidangos
Our paper represents the first attempt in the literature to estimate the properties of business income risk from privately held businesses in the US. Using a new, large, and confidential panel of US income tax returns for the period 1987-2009, we extensively document the empirical stylized facts about the evolution of various business income risk measures over time. We find that business income is much riskier than labor income, not only because of the probability of business exit, but also because of higher income fluctuations, conditional on no exit. We show that business income is less persistent, but is also characterized by higher probabilities of extreme upward transition, compared to labor income. Furthermore, the distribution of percent changes for business income is more dispersed than that for labor income, and it also indicates that business income faces substantially higher tail risks. Our results suggest that the high-income households are more likely to bear both the big positive and the big negative business income percent changes.
{"title":"The Properties of Income Risk in Privately Held Businesses","authors":"J. Debacker, B. Heim, Vasia Panousi, Shanthi P. Ramnath, Ivan Vidangos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2190172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2190172","url":null,"abstract":"Our paper represents the first attempt in the literature to estimate the properties of business income risk from privately held businesses in the US. Using a new, large, and confidential panel of US income tax returns for the period 1987-2009, we extensively document the empirical stylized facts about the evolution of various business income risk measures over time. We find that business income is much riskier than labor income, not only because of the probability of business exit, but also because of higher income fluctuations, conditional on no exit. We show that business income is less persistent, but is also characterized by higher probabilities of extreme upward transition, compared to labor income. Furthermore, the distribution of percent changes for business income is more dispersed than that for labor income, and it also indicates that business income faces substantially higher tail risks. Our results suggest that the high-income households are more likely to bear both the big positive and the big negative business income percent changes.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124527692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Managing tax risk is one of the greatest challenges for tax departments around the world (creating the opportunities to build relationships with revenue services), starting with the verification audit through to the resolution of tax controversies. A recent survey supports this contention. Key aspects that emerged can be summarized as follows:Tax risk is everywhere. Companies continue to face increased pressure on the tax function. As a result, tax functions are focused on addressing risks in every major area of the tax life-cycle: planning, provision, compliance, and controversy. Improving the tax function is clearly more important than ever, with more than 90% of companies indicating this will be an important area for them over the next two years.People are a tax risk: 87% of respondents identified people as an important challenge facing the tax department. Companies are struggling to get enough people to staff their tax department. They are also challenged to train the people they have, with 77% of companies indicating that the lack of skilled resources is a contributing factor to tax risk.The trend (proactive versus reactive): Today, companies report a significant increase in the time they spend identifying, managing, tracking, and responding on tax risk. The number of companies who spend at least 20% of their time on tax risk increased over the last two years from 16% to 25%. Leading tax functions are responding by becoming more efficient and broadening their response to risk. Building linkages to other parts of the organization is becoming increasingly important.Communication is key: Companies that have regular communications with their board about tax risk are also more likely to report having specific measures in place to address those risks. The difference seems to be that they take a broad approach to tax risk assessment and work to efficiently leverage their people, processes and technology.
{"title":"Special Report: Global Tax Audit and Controversy Risk Management","authors":"D. Erasmus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1575723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1575723","url":null,"abstract":"Managing tax risk is one of the greatest challenges for tax departments around the world (creating the opportunities to build relationships with revenue services), starting with the verification audit through to the resolution of tax controversies. A recent survey supports this contention. Key aspects that emerged can be summarized as follows:Tax risk is everywhere. Companies continue to face increased pressure on the tax function. As a result, tax functions are focused on addressing risks in every major area of the tax life-cycle: planning, provision, compliance, and controversy. Improving the tax function is clearly more important than ever, with more than 90% of companies indicating this will be an important area for them over the next two years.People are a tax risk: 87% of respondents identified people as an important challenge facing the tax department. Companies are struggling to get enough people to staff their tax department. They are also challenged to train the people they have, with 77% of companies indicating that the lack of skilled resources is a contributing factor to tax risk.The trend (proactive versus reactive): Today, companies report a significant increase in the time they spend identifying, managing, tracking, and responding on tax risk. The number of companies who spend at least 20% of their time on tax risk increased over the last two years from 16% to 25%. Leading tax functions are responding by becoming more efficient and broadening their response to risk. Building linkages to other parts of the organization is becoming increasingly important.Communication is key: Companies that have regular communications with their board about tax risk are also more likely to report having specific measures in place to address those risks. The difference seems to be that they take a broad approach to tax risk assessment and work to efficiently leverage their people, processes and technology.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127293851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Coase Theorem and the vast literature it inspired explore two basic questions: to whom should responsibility for external harms be assigned and how will that assignment matter. Building on the Coasean insight in the torts context, Guido Calabresi observed that the assignment of tort liability can indeed matter from an efficiency perspective and should, under certain assumptions, be assigned to the "cheapest cost avoider." This article applies a similar Coasean/Calabresian framework to a related (though not identical) set of questions in the tax context: To whom should the responsibility for remitting taxes be assigned and when and how will that assignment matter? Following Calabresi's canonical formulation for the design of an optimal tort system, we conclude that an optimal tax remittance regime requires that tax liabilities be assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and administration for a given level of achievement of the tax law's desired distributional and revenue goals. This will sometimes mean assigning tax remittance responsibility to the lowest-compliance-cost remitter, and other times not - if that party happens also to be the lowest-cost liability avoider (the party best able to evade the tax). This comparison of tax remittance responsibility and tort remittance responsibility produces a number of positive and normative insights. For example, it helps to explain why the remittance responsibility for the retail sales tax lies primarily with the sellers rather than the buyers, as well as why we have wage withholding for the income tax. And it helps to explain some existing types of non-wage withholding, such as withholding on payments to foreign taxpayers. This framework also supports a number of reforms in the current U.S. regime for tax enforcement such as expanding the withholding requirement to payments made to independent contractors, which are a type of payment that currently contributes significantly to the overall U.S. federal tax gap.
{"title":"Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability","authors":"Kyle D. Logue, J. Slemrod","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1335924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1335924","url":null,"abstract":"The Coase Theorem and the vast literature it inspired explore two basic questions: to whom should responsibility for external harms be assigned and how will that assignment matter. Building on the Coasean insight in the torts context, Guido Calabresi observed that the assignment of tort liability can indeed matter from an efficiency perspective and should, under certain assumptions, be assigned to the \"cheapest cost avoider.\" This article applies a similar Coasean/Calabresian framework to a related (though not identical) set of questions in the tax context: To whom should the responsibility for remitting taxes be assigned and when and how will that assignment matter? Following Calabresi's canonical formulation for the design of an optimal tort system, we conclude that an optimal tax remittance regime requires that tax liabilities be assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and administration for a given level of achievement of the tax law's desired distributional and revenue goals. This will sometimes mean assigning tax remittance responsibility to the lowest-compliance-cost remitter, and other times not - if that party happens also to be the lowest-cost liability avoider (the party best able to evade the tax). This comparison of tax remittance responsibility and tort remittance responsibility produces a number of positive and normative insights. For example, it helps to explain why the remittance responsibility for the retail sales tax lies primarily with the sellers rather than the buyers, as well as why we have wage withholding for the income tax. And it helps to explain some existing types of non-wage withholding, such as withholding on payments to foreign taxpayers. This framework also supports a number of reforms in the current U.S. regime for tax enforcement such as expanding the withholding requirement to payments made to independent contractors, which are a type of payment that currently contributes significantly to the overall U.S. federal tax gap.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"21 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130802097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is a tax shelter that purports to eliminate more than $200 million of gain, with an investment of $2 million and no realistic possibility of profit, "too good to be true"‘ According to the Court of Federal Claims, which filed its decision in Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States on July 31, the answer is yes. In a lengthy opinion, Judge Christine Miller found that a contingent-liability shelter lacked economic substance and affirmed hefty partnership-level penalties. In a setback for the government, however, the court declared the retroactive section 752 regulations invalid. The decision highlights three issues of special interest for practitioners: economic substance, retroactive regulations, and penalties.
在7月31日Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States一案中，联邦索赔法院(Court of Federal Claims)的裁决显示，答案是肯定的。该法院声称，以200万美元的投资，并没有实际盈利的可能性，就能消除超过2亿美元的收益。在一份冗长的意见书中，法官克里斯汀·米勒(Christine Miller)认为，或有责任避难所缺乏经济实质，并确认对合伙企业处以高额罚款。然而，法院宣布溯及既往的第752条规定无效，这对政府来说是一次挫折。该决定强调了从业人员特别感兴趣的三个问题:经济实质、追溯性法规和处罚。
{"title":"Stobie Creek: Too Good to Be True‘","authors":"K. Burke, G. McCouch","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1211923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1211923","url":null,"abstract":"Is a tax shelter that purports to eliminate more than $200 million of gain, with an investment of $2 million and no realistic possibility of profit, \"too good to be true\"‘ According to the Court of Federal Claims, which filed its decision in Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States on July 31, the answer is yes. In a lengthy opinion, Judge Christine Miller found that a contingent-liability shelter lacked economic substance and affirmed hefty partnership-level penalties. In a setback for the government, however, the court declared the retroactive section 752 regulations invalid. The decision highlights three issues of special interest for practitioners: economic substance, retroactive regulations, and penalties.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132540725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-05-01DOI: 10.1628/001522113X666926
V. Kanniainen, P. Panteghini
This paper shows that taxes which are understood to be neutral with respect to the marginal investment decisions may be distortionary with respect to entrepreneurial decisions. In particular, we apply an intertemporal model to show that a comprehensive income tax is distortionary unless all kinds of income are subject to the same tax rate and a worker's option to become an entrepreneur is accounted for. Similarly, the harsh condition of a uniform tax rate is necessary but not sufficient under "new view" dividend tax, cash flow tax, and ACE tax, so that the occupational choice is not distorted. In any case, informational problems may arise and lead to distortive effects.
{"title":"Tax Neutrality: Illusion or Reality? The Case of Entrepreneurship","authors":"V. Kanniainen, P. Panteghini","doi":"10.1628/001522113X666926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1628/001522113X666926","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that taxes which are understood to be neutral with respect to the marginal investment decisions may be distortionary with respect to entrepreneurial decisions. In particular, we apply an intertemporal model to show that a comprehensive income tax is distortionary unless all kinds of income are subject to the same tax rate and a worker's option to become an entrepreneur is accounted for. Similarly, the harsh condition of a uniform tax rate is necessary but not sufficient under \"new view\" dividend tax, cash flow tax, and ACE tax, so that the occupational choice is not distorted. In any case, informational problems may arise and lead to distortive effects.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124439509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
After the 1980's, LBO projects have dramatically increased on the American and European markets. Despite the high level of debt, they provide significant gains and they improve the productivity of the acquired firms. First, we describe the evolution of this industry on these markets, we focus particularly on the french market. Then we present the factors that explain the LBO "wave". We find several factors such as financial globalization, lower interest rates, tax and managerial terms, legal mechanisms... Finally, we study the risks of LBO acquisition. We distinguish financial risks, social risks and tax and legal risks.
{"title":"The LBO: Stakes and Perspectives","authors":"Safa Ben Thabet, O. Yousfi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1116207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116207","url":null,"abstract":"After the 1980's, LBO projects have dramatically increased on the American and European markets. Despite the high level of debt, they provide significant gains and they improve the productivity of the acquired firms. First, we describe the evolution of this industry on these markets, we focus particularly on the french market. Then we present the factors that explain the LBO \"wave\". We find several factors such as financial globalization, lower interest rates, tax and managerial terms, legal mechanisms... Finally, we study the risks of LBO acquisition. We distinguish financial risks, social risks and tax and legal risks.","PeriodicalId":365252,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Tax (Sub-Topic)","volume":"272 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134228708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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