Dissecting Bankruptcy Frictions

W. Dou, Lucian A. Taylor, Wei Wang, Wenyu Wang
{"title":"Dissecting Bankruptcy Frictions","authors":"W. Dou, Lucian A. Taylor, Wei Wang, Wenyu Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3383837","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the U.S.? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find that the bankruptcy process is quite inefficient, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and the remaining court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small.","PeriodicalId":119201,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"33","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3383837","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33

Abstract

How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the U.S.? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find that the bankruptcy process is quite inefficient, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and the remaining court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
剖析破产摩擦
美国的企业破产效率如何?两种摩擦,即信息不对称和债权人之间的利益冲突,可能导致几种低效率:过度清算、过度延续和过度延迟。我们发现破产程序效率低下,主要是由于过度拖延。消除信息不对称将使平均总支出增加4%,消除利益冲突将使其增加18%以上。如果没有这些摩擦,14%的案件将在法庭前得到解决,剩余的法庭案件将缩短73%。如果延迟减少,破产的间接成本将大大降低。相比之下,过度清算和过度延续造成的低效率相当小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Quality and Pricing Decisions for Reward-based Crowdfunding: Effects of Moral Hazard Punish Underperformance with Resting Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost A reconsideration of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market model by information theory Learning from Law Enforcement Pulp Friction: The Value of Quantity Contracts in Decentralized Markets
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1