Dynamic Pricing with External Information and Inventory Constraint

Xiaocheng Li, Zeyu Zheng
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

A merchant dynamically sets prices in each time period when selling a product over a finite time horizon with a given initial inventory. The merchant utilizes new external information that is observed at the beginning of each time period, whereas the demand function—how the external information and the price jointly impact that single-period demand distribution—is unknown. The merchant’s decision, setting price dynamically, serves dual roles to learn the unknown demand function and to balance inventory with an ultimate objective to maximize the expected cumulative revenue. The main objective of this work is to characterize and provide a full spectrum of relations between the order of optimal expected cumulative revenue achieved in three decision-making regimes: the merchant’s online decision-making regime, a clairvoyant regime with complete knowledge about the demand function, and a deterministic regime in which all the uncertainties are relaxed to the expectations. In the analyses, we derive an unconstrained representation of the optimality gap for generic constrained online learning problems, which renders tractable lower and upper bounds for the expected revenue achieved by dynamic pricing algorithms between different regimes. This analytical framework also inspires the design of two dual-based dynamic pricing algorithms for the clairvoyant and online regimes. This paper was accepted by Hamid Nazerzadeh, data science. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4963 .
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考虑外部信息和库存约束的动态定价
在给定初始库存的有限时间范围内销售产品时,商家在每个时间段动态设置价格。商家利用在每个时间段开始时观察到的新的外部信息,而需求函数——外部信息和价格如何共同影响单期需求分布——是未知的。商家动态定价的决策具有学习未知需求函数和平衡库存的双重作用,最终目标是期望累计收益最大化。这项工作的主要目标是描述并提供在三种决策机制中实现的最优预期累积收入顺序之间的关系的全部范围:商人的在线决策机制,对需求函数有完全了解的洞察力机制,以及所有不确定性都放松到预期的确定性机制。在分析中,我们推导了一般约束在线学习问题的最优性差距的无约束表示,该表示为不同制度之间动态定价算法实现的期望收益提供了可处理的下界和上界。这个分析框架也启发了两种基于双重的动态定价算法的设计,用于透视和在线制度。本文被数据科学的Hamid Nazerzadeh接受。补充材料:在线附录和数据可在https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4963上获得。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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